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ARTICLES
SEX AND LIES: RULES OF ETHICS, RULES OF
EVIDENCE, AND OUR CONFLICTED VIEWS ON
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HONESTY
DIANE H. MAZUR*
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no other spectacle captured the sense of our con-
temporary fascination with the virtues of honesty and truthful-
ness as well as one day's hearing during the congressional
investigation preceding President Clinton's impeachment.1 On
that day, witnesses from three very different schools of experi-
ence testified before the House Judiciary Committee to share
their respective understandings of "the consequences of perjury
and related crimes."2 These witnesses created a framework for
three themes that could not have been more different from one
another,' yet taken together they symbolized how dysfunctional
our views of the significance of honesty and truthfulness have
become.
Two classes of expertise offered by witnesses at the hearing,
coupled with the respective themes they were designed to foster,
were entirely predictable, given both the general subject matter
and the individual target of the inquiry. A number of legal pro-
fessionals, including three federal appellate judges and three law
professors, testified concerning the consequences of dishonesty
and untruthfulness for the legal system in general and for Presi-
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2000-01. Cap-
tain, U.S. Air Force, 1979-83.
1. For general background on the Clinton impeachment proceedings,
see Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union,
51 STAN. L. REv. 309 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U.
PA. L. REv. 279 (1998).
2. The Consequences of Pejury and Related Crimes: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) [hereinafter Perjury Hearing].
3. See id. at 15 ("We have before us 11 witnesses who share practically
nothing in common.") (statement of Rep. Charles Schumer).
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dent Clinton in particular. These judges and professors were
joined on the panel by several high-ranking retired military
officers who testified on the effect of dishonesty and untruthful-
ness within a military chain of command and, more specifically,
the effect of the Commander-in-Chiefs failure to be truthful on
the morale of the rank and file of servicemembers below. The
witnesses professed to be speaking as individuals and not as rep-
resentatives of the institutions with which they were affiliated, but
that distinction likely made little practical difference given the
purpose of their testimony, which was to speak to institutional
effect and not to individual belief or conviction.
The tone for the committee's consideration of untruthful-
ness and its effect on the rule of law was set by its chairman,
Henry Hyde, in his opening statement:
We make perjury, subornation of perjury, obstruction of
justice, and witness tampering crimes because ajudicial sys-
tem can only succeed if its procedures expose the truth. If
citizens are allowed to lie with impunity or encourage
others to tell false stories or hide evidence, judges and
juries cannot reach just results. At that point, the court-
room becomes an arena for artful liars and the jury a mere
focus group choosing between alternative fictions.
*. . Lying poisons justice. If we are to defend justice
and the rule of law, lying must have consequences.4
The indispensable nature of truth to legal justice was the
theme of the interchange between members of the committee
and witnesses from the profession of law. One witness, a law pro-
fessor, observed:
[The committee has] the opportunity to promote the rule
of law and to emphasize the importance of truth in judicial
proceedings if it declares that no witness, not the Presi-
dent, not anybody, may deliberately deceive a court and
deliberately create a false impression of facts.5
Without the ability to compel individuals to speak the truth in
courts of law, a number of legislators argued, the legal system
cannot provide justice:
Those parties to every lawsuit out there expect truth to be
told. If witnesses that they call or witnesses who are called
lie or encourage other people to lie or hide evidence or
encourage other people to hide evidence, then the parties
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 92 (testimony of Prof. Stephen Saltzburg).
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to that lawsuit can't get justice, they can't get a fair judg-
ment. That is what undermines the court system.
6
While a substantial part of the testimony of the legal experts
centered on the relative technicality of whether impeachment
was an appropriate constitutional sanction for lying under oath,'
the military witnesses were much more open to expansive judg-
ments of the immorality of untruthfulness. Their theme was
both simple and familiar. President Clinton's behavior had,
once again, weakened the military's ability to carry out its mission
by eroding the morale, good order, and discipline of the men
and women who serve.8
Exchanges between the committee members and the mili-
tary men appearing before them established that truthfulness was
a critical component of successful military leadership. One
retired four-star admiral described that ethic of truthfulness as
follows: "The integrity of an officer's word, signature, commit-
ment to truth concerning what is right, and acting to correct
what is wrong, must be natural, involved and rise to the forefront
of any decision or issue."9 That responsibility extended to the
very top of the chain of command, which, under our system of
civilian control of the military, ends with the President. As a
result, the admiral concluded, "those who hold that leadership
position to be credible should meet the same standards."'" The
6. Id. at 105 (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum).
7. See Eric Schmitt, Consequences of Perjury Debated in House, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 1998, at A23.
8. Committee members from the majority also spent more time question-
ing witnesses in uniform than witnesses out of uniform, perhaps because the
President is seen as much more vulnerable to military criticism. Furthermore,
the military witnesses were not encumbered by having to address differences of
opinion, as were the legal experts, because no military witnesses sympathetic to
the President's position appeared before the committee.
One of the more flagrant instances of military disrespect directed at Presi-
dent Clinton occurred shortly after he took office, when the Air Force's Major
General Harold N. Campbell made public reference to his Commander-in-
Chief as "skirt chasing," "draft dodging," and "dope smoking." Michael R.
Gordon, General Ousted for Derisive Remarks About President, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1993, at A9. General Campbell's statements were in violation of Article 88 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which prohibits commissioned officers
from using "contemptuous words against the President." 10 U.S.C. § 888
(1994). He was reprimanded, fined, and forced to retire. In another incident,
SenatorJesse Helms suggested that President Clinton's unpopularity on North
Carolina military bases might put him in danger of violence by servicemembers.
"Mr. Clinton better watch out if he comes down here. He'd better have a body-
guard." Steven Greenhouse, Helms Takes New Swipe at Clinton, Then Calls It Mis-
take, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1994, at A19.
9. Perury Hearing, supra note 2, at 77 (testimony of Adm. Leon Edney).
10. Id.
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committee's theme of the military necessity for truthfulness was
nothing less than an imperative: "If we lie to ourselves as an insti-
tution, or as individuals within that institution, we are laying the
seeds of our own individual and national destruction."1 1
As predictable as the appearance of law professors, judges,
and senior military officers were, the appearance of the third set
of witnesses before the committee that day was equally unpredict-
able. Two witnesses were called in support of this third and final
theme, both of them women, in contrast to the otherwise all-
male panel. Their testimony, especially in the case of one of the
witnesses, was also likely the saddest and most exploitative display
offered by congressional Republicans during the entire impeach-
ment investigation. 2 Pam Parsons, a Mormon woman from
Utah, was once a college basketball coach at the University of
South Carolina. 3 By the late 1970s, Parsons and Pat Head Sum-
mitt of the University of Tennessee (today's premier women's
coach) were the two most successful young coaches in the
women's game. Pane Parsons was (and is) also gay, and as a
coach was working in a profession that tolerated only secrecy on
that issue.14 One might reasonably ask why the Republican mem-
bers of the committee chose an openly lesbian basketball coach
as their first, most prominent witness in support of their themes
of honesty and truthfulness.' 5 The explanation is that Pam Par-
11. Id. at 78.
12. See Francis X. Clines, Penitents Called by G.O.P. Speak on Perils of Pejury,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
13. For descriptions of the events that would eventually lead to Pam Par-
sons' testimony before Congress during President Clinton's impeachment
inquiry, see, for example, Liz Chandler, Coach Has Left Sad Legacy; Parsons Still
Shunned; She Broke Most Essential Bond of Profession, SE.A-rLE TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996,
at D6; John Heilprin, Perjury; The Lie: Utahns Squared Off in '84 Case That Has
Resurfaced in Clinton Inquiry; Utahn Caught Coach in Perjury About Lesbian Sex, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Dec. 3, 1998, at Al.
14. To this day, some college coaches engage in "negative recruiting" by
scaring high school girls and their parents with reports that other universities'
women's athletic programs permit lesbian coaches or players. See PAT GRIFFIN,
STRONG WOMEN, DEEP CLOSETS: LESBIANS AND HOMOPHOBIA IN SPORT (1998);
MARIAH BURTON NELSON, THE STRONGER WOMEN GET, THE MORE MEN LovE
FOOTBALL: SEXISM AND THE AMERICAN CULTURE OF SPORTS 189 (1994); Mike
Fish, Women in Sports: Growing Pains; The Lesbian Issue Off the Court, ATLANTA
CONST., Sept. 24, 1998, at 1G.
15. The committee majority endeavored to complete hours of testimony
and questions without a single reference to the fact that the witness before
them was gay, or that the false statement that led to her perjury conviction
concerned patronage of a gay bar. They were almost successful in containing
any explanations of her conviction to something in the nature of "false testi-
mony about a sexual relationship during a civil case." Perjury Hearing, supra
note 2, at 6. One congressman, certain that her false statement, like President
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sons is a poster child for remorse about lying in matters involving
sex.
Parsons sued Sports Illustrated magazine for libel after its
February 1982 publication of an expos6 (in its annual swimsuit
edition, no less) reporting that Parsons had begun a relationship
with a seventeen-year-old who later, after receiving a high-school-
equivalency certificate, enrolled at the University of South Caro-
lina to play basketball. Given that the allegations were funda-
mentally true, her decision to file suit was one of exceedingly
poor and desperate judgment,16 but its motivation was under-
standable. She had already lost her position at South Carolina,
and faced the end of a very promising coaching career if she
could not convince other universities that the Sports Illustrated
story was untrue. 17 During the trial, which ended with a verdict
for Sports Illustrated, Parsons lied in response to a question
whether she had ever visited a certain gay bar in Salt Lake City,
Utah. She was prosecuted for perjury,'8 convicted, and incarcer-
Clinton's, must have involved a sex act, asked her whether the subject of her
perjury was consensual sex; he quickly moved to another subject after her unex-
pected answer. See id. at 11 (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum). The only other
reference came much later in the hearing, when Rep. SheilaJackson Lee asked
Parsons whether her motivation for lying arose from the embarassment of "alle-
gations dealing with another female." Id. at 31.
16. Many would say that Parsons also exhibited extraordinarily poor judg-
ment by beginning an intimate relationship with a high school senior who later
played basketball on the college team she coached. I would add, however, that
comparatively little uproar follows when a young female athlete marries an
older male coach. See NELSON, supra note 14, at 173, 188-89.
17. Anita Allen (now Allen-Castellitto) has written a perceptive article
highlighting the similarities in how President Clinton and Oscar Wilde
responded to the scandals arising from their sexual indiscretions. See Anita L.
Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REv. 161 (1999). Both Clinton and
Wilde entered into relationships with younger, less mature partners, vilified the
investigators who intrusively sought evidence of their conduct, and lied and
dissembled in an effort to convince others the allegations were false. See id. at
175-76.
Pam Parsons' story is, sadly, even more a modern-day equivalent of the
trials of Oscar Wilde. Desperate to maintain his respectable status, Wilde fool-
ishly brought suit for defamation after his paramour's father condemned him
as a "sodomite." Investigation by the defendant easily unearthed painfully per-
sonal evidence that the statement was true. "Thus, Wilde's futile attempt at a
face-saving lawsuit against Queensberry led to his conviction for sodomy and
sentencing to two grueling years of hard labor, a sentence that broke his health
and ruined and shortened his life." Id. at 175.
18. The lawyer who represented Parsons in the Sports Illustrated suit
believes that his client was prosecuted for perjury because she was "the architect
of her own destruction." Edward Walsh & William Claiborne, Hearing on Perjury
Shows Partisan Divide, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at A18. In the judge's
opinion, Parsons initiated a lawsuit with the intention of lying and had there-
20001
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ated in a federal prison for four months, followed by five years of
probation.
Parsons never coached again, of course, and has worked as a
house painter, waitress, and yard-keeper since her release. Her
remorse before the committee, however, was profuse: "Thank
God I could finally say 'I'm guilty.' . . . [T]hat day that I got
slapped into recognizing that, yes, there are things that you pay
consequences for, my life had a chance to turn around."19 On
the day of the hearing, she became an unwitting role model for
the President of the United States and, in the words of one con-
gressman, one of those "now being talked about in terms almost
of being American heroes."
20
I. JUSTIFYING UNTRUTHFULNESS
Sissela Bok has been one of the most prominent philoso-
phers to study the moral judgment of dishonesty and untruthful-
ness. 21 Her work has often been used as a guide by those in the
legal academy for the evaluation of lying in a legal context.
22
fore "manipulat[ed] the system." Id. Asked to compare President Clinton's cir-
cumstances with his client's case, the lawyer responded: "[To compare Pam
Parsons with the President is to compare mules with Man o' War. It's a totally
different situation. It makes no sense to compare them.... She was the archi-
tect of that case." Id.
Parsons' companion witness, Barbara Battalino, had also initiated the claim
that set the stage for her false testimony. Battalino was a Veterans Administra-
tion doctor who had a consensual relationship with a male veteran who was a
client of the VA but not her own patient. The veteran filed suit against her for
medical malpractice and sexual harassment, which was dismissed. Not knowing
when to let a good thing rest, however, Battalino continued to press her claim
for indemnification by the federal government. She lied in response to a ques-
tion whether "anything of a sexual nature" took place in her VA office, and was
prosecuted for that false answer after her paramour offered surreptitious
recordings of their telephone conversations to the government. Convicted of a
felony count of obstruction of justice, Battalino lost her license to practice
medicine. See Perjury Hearing, supra note 2, at 7-9, 45-46, 56-57 (testimony of
Barbara Battalino), 101 (testimony of Prof. Jeffrey Rosen); Walsh & Claiborne,
supra, at A18.
19. Perjury Hearing, supra note 2, at 6.
20. Id. at 55 (statement of Rep. Lindsey Graham). This hearing provided
perhaps the first and the last occasion that a gay American was praised as a "real
American" during a congressional investigation. See id. at 157-58 (statement of
Rep. Bob Barr).
21. See SISSELA BoK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE
(1979) [hereinafter BoK, LYING];SISSELA BoK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CON-
CEALMENT AND REVELATION (1982) [hereinafter BOK, SECRETS].
22. For example, are lies by law enforcement personnel to criminal sus-
pects justifiable when employed as a ruse for the purpose of gathering evi-
dence? See Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and
Documentation, 76 OR. L. REv. 833 (1997) (charting a middle course by relying
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This article applies Bok's framework in similar fashion, measur-
ing the significance of honesty-or its absence-across a variety
of ethical and evidentiary contexts, both military and civilian.
The congressional hearing described earlier might be
described as Kantian in nature in that its majority message would
broach no lying no matter what the circumstances. 23 To the leg-
islators controlling the hearing, truth-telling was a virtue so valua-
ble in and of itself as to make unnecessary any balance of benefit
and harm. In Kant's words, "For a lie always harms another; if
not some other particular man, still it harms mankind generally,
for it vitiates the source of law itself.... To be truthful (honest)
in all declarations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely com-
manding decree of reason, limited by no expediency."
24
Bok, in contrast, would not enforce such an inflexible stan-
dard. She would concede that lies could be justified under some
limited circumstances, although the burden of justification
placed on one seeking dispensation would be extremely high.
Bok believes that truthfulness should be the default expectation:
"There is an initial imbalance in the evaluation of truth-telling
and lying. Lying requires a reason, while truth-telling does not.
It must be excused; reasons must be produced, in any one case,
to show why a particular lie is not 'mean and culpable."'
25
The heavy burden of justification that Bok imposes arises
primarily from her mistrust of the liar's motivations. She finds it
almost impossible to perform a valid comparison of risk and ben-
efit for a given lie because those competing values are usually
assigned by the individual who speaks the lie, not the one who is
deceived. The bias is inherent, difficult both to detect and to
neutralize. 26 "The long-range results of an acceptance of such
facile calculations, made by those most biased to favor their own
primarily on constitutional protections to identify permissible investigative lies);
Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 76 OR. L. REv. 817 (1997) (concluding that
investigative lies by police are justifiable only when necessary to save lives);
Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76
OR. L. REv. 775 (1997) (concluding that investigative lies by police are justifi-
able under some circumstances).
23. Describing the hearings as "Kantian" would be kind. Others, like
myself, might term them merely sanctimonious or hypocritical.
24. BOK, LYING, supra note 21, at 267, 269 (excerpting IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF PRAcricAL REASON AND OTHER WRrrINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
346-50 (Lewis White Beck ed., 1949)); see also id. at 37-39 (describing Kant's
absolutist position).
25. Id. at 22.
26. See id. at 83 ("Because claims to fairness involve deeply personal views
about what one deserves or what is one's right, they are extraordinarily prone to
misinterpretation and bias.").
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interests and to disregard risks to others, would be severe."27
Despite the difficulty of assessing the risk and benefit imposed by
a given lie in a manner that takes into account the perspective of
both the author of the lie and its recipient, however, Bok is will-
ing to try.28 Assessment of risk would be more important than
assessment of benefit because, first, the presumption always
favors the telling of truth and, second, the liar is normally unable
to fairly assess risk imposed by her own untruthfulness. In keep-
ing with that presumption of truthfulness and suspicion of pur-
ported benefit, Bok requires proponents to identify truthful
alternatives, weigh moral reasons for and against the lie, and
incorporate. a perspective that reaches beyond individual
excuses.
29
Bok's model of risk-benefit analysis first identifies the risks
to be evaluated and then outlines a procedure for evaluation of
their significance. The potential risks of lying are three: "imme-
diate harm to others"; "the harm that lying does to the liars
themselves"; and "the harm done to the general level of trust and
social cooperation." ° Once the potential harms are identified,
they should be evaluated in a manner that minimizes the inevita-
bly biased influence of the prospective liar. First, the individual
seeking to justify a failure to tell the truth should appeal to her
own conscience for guidance in balancing risk and benefit.31
Second, she should appeal to her own circle of peers and col-
leagues to determine if they would agree with her assessment.
3 2
The problem with the second stage, of course, is that often indi-
27. Id. at 50-51. One might consider, however, whether the equation
might change if, by a false statement, an individual exposed herself to risk
beyond the risks of discovery normally appurtenant to lying. I am thinking, of
course, of gay servicemembers who potentially expose themselves to federal
prosecution or administrative dismissal on the basis of their intimate lives, not
to mention sanctions for lying. Perhaps a liar's own assessment of benefit is
more accurate when the associated personal risk is extraordinary. An analo-
gous concept is found in Federal Rule of Evidence 804, which deems hearsay
statements sufficently reliable and trustworthy to be admitted if the statement
was "so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so
far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reason-
able person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true." FED. R. EVID. 804.
28. See id. at 55 ("[Tlhe questions which I shall ask of justifications
advanced for different lies will, in the end, be questions of benefit and harm,
questions asking why lying matters and what it does to individuals and
institutions.").
29. See id. at 103-04.
30. Id. at 24.
31. See id. at 94-95.
32. See id. at 96-97.
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viduals seek out expert opinion only from those who would
agree, something quite analogous, for example, to the selection
of witnesses appearing before a congressional committee. A
third stage of evaluation, therefore, is necessary. At that point,
prospective liars must meet a test of publicity, which requires jus-
tification of competing risk and benefit imposed by the lie to rea-
sonable persons of diverse allegiances."3 It is this third stage I
seek to reach through this article.3 4
II. TRUTH AND THE MILITARY
There may be no other profession that embraces an ethic of
truthfulness, honesty, and integrity to the degree to which the
military does. Military effectiveness fundamentally depends on
trust between servicemembers, whether of superior, subordinate,
or equal rank. Unquestioning trust in the complete candor of
information provided throughout the military chain of com-
mand is a necessity for a profession that as a matter of course asks
its members to place themselves in harm's way.
The military witnesses who testified concerning this ethic of
truthfulness focused on the inseparability of honesty, trust, and
mission readiness. As the retired admiral on the panel
explained, "Success in combat, which is our business, depends on
trust and confidence in our leaders and in each other.... This
trust and confidence must exist up and down the chain of com-
mand where operations require execution of orders that endan-
ger lives." 5 The importance of the ethic, therefore, matches the
tremendous magnitude of the risk. "There can be no compro-
mise on this issue, when professionally the ultimate you can
33. See id. at 97-103.
34. Bok notes her concern that, in some circumstances, members of the
general public may be so incapable of imagining themselves a party to a particu-
lar lie that their perspective retains as much bias as the perspective of those
more directly affected. Interestingly, though, Bok's concern is that the public
may not be able to empathize with the perspective of the deceived, which might
be the case, for example, with respect to investigative lies to criminal suspects by
police. "An inflamed and threatened public can be unreasonable in the
extreme. The more unlikely it is that the public will ever share the predicament
of the deceived, the more difficult the shift of perspectives becomes, and the
more bias can creep into the evaluation." Id. at 102. For purposes of this arti-
cle, my concern would be that members of the general public would have diffi-
culty imagining themselves in the role of one forced to lie, as in the case of
servicemembers burdened and coerced by "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Bok admits
that her moral philosophy of lying applies poorly to coercive circumstances,
which would include the military's treatment of its gay servicemembers, but
hopes that her work will "shed light also on the relation between coercion and
deception, whether in a family, an institution, or a society." Id. at xxii.
35. Perjury Hearing, supra note 2, at 76 (testimony of Adm. Leon Edney).
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demand of a subordinate is that he or she lay down their life in
the execution of your orders on behalf of this country."36
Justification of the ethic of truthfulness, however, extends
beyond the immediacy of orders in the midst of combat. Ser-
vicemembers learn that military service requires a level of candor
unfamiliar to the civilian world." Mistakes and shortcomings
must be revealed, not hidden, so that they will not be repeated in
less forgiving circumstances. "Mistakes will happen and can be
corrected, usually with a positive learning curve. To cover up
mistakes and responsibility by lying or obstruction cannot be
tolerated."
38
Prospective officers at each of the federal military academies
are indoctrinated in a strict ethic of honesty and truthfulness.
Under the Honor Code in effect at each of the academies, cadets
and midshipmen vow, quite simply, that they will not lie, cheat,
or steal.3 9 In the words of one officer-to-be, the honor system is
"the ultimate reflection of what it meant to be a midshipman....
Those without respect for honor, for the truth, were simply
unworthy .... ,,40 The honor system's definition of lying, more-
over, extends beyond the sort of blatant, affirmative falsehood
usually associated with the term. A violation of the Honor Code
can also occur through mere "quibbling,"41 verbal evasiveness
that is misleading or incomplete without being directly false.42
36. Id. at 77.
37. See THOMAS E. RIcKS, MAKING THE CoRPs 56 (1997) (quoting a Marine
Corps drill instructor's admonition to new recruits: "You must be completely
honest in everything you do."). "It is a rigid code, bristling with values alien to
many of these recruits." Id.
38. Perjury Hearing, supra note 2, at 77.
39. SeeJOSEPH STEFFAN, HONOR BoUND: A GAY AMERICAN FIGHTS FOR THE
RIGHT TO SERVE His CouNTRY 46 (1992);JUDITH H. STIEHM, BRING ME MEN AND
WOMEN: MANDATED CHANGE AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY 63-64 (1981).
40. STEFFAN, supra note 39, at 46.
41. STIEHM, supra note 39, at 63.
42. See LuCiAN K TRUSCOTr IV, DREss GRAY 259 (1978) (defining quib-
bling as a "failure to tell 'the whole truth'"). One of the most well-known fic-
tional representations of the Honor Code in action, the novel (and television
movie) Dress Gray featured "quibbling" in response to an intrusive question
about sexual conduct. The accuser in this best-selling book, ironically, was a
closeted gay cadet; the presumably heterosexual violator of the Honor Code
was forced to withdraw from the Academy because he gave a misleading and
evasive (although perhaps subjectively true) answer when asked if he was a vir-
gin. See id. at 260-75. Truscott is a graduate of the United States Military Acad-
emy at West Point, a son of a graduate, a grandson of a WWII four-star general,
and a Vietnam combat veteran. His father, a retired Colonel, testified before
Congress in favor of lifting the ban against gay servicemembers. See Policy Impli-
cations of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 6-7 (1993).
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That same concern with deceptive evasiveness is found in the
officer's oath of office, in which the individual taking the oath
swears to protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States, taking that obligation "freely, without any mental reserva-
tion or purpose of evasion."4
Far from being an academic exercise in ethics, the military's
expectations for an ethic of truthfulness are grounded in day-to-
day operational necessity:
Men may be inexact or even untruthful in ordinary matters
and suffer as a consequence only the disesteem of their
associates or the unconvenience [sic] of unfavorable litiga-
tion, but the inexact or untruthful soldier trifles with the
lives of his fellow men and with the honor of his
44government ....
The congressional perjury hearing was therefore replete with
concern that President Clinton's failure to be completely and
truthfully responsive about his marital indiscretions would
undermine good order and discipline in the military. A con-
gressman from South Carolina, a state with a strong affinity for
the military,45 contended that military families "are severely
affected by what is going on in the White House and that morale
is dangerously low and dangerously affected by what they per-
ceive is a clear lie by the commander in chief."' 46 One of the
witnesses believed, incredibly enough, that President Clinton's
falsehoods and evasions would cause some citizens to opt against
joining the military and cause some current servicemembers to
43. STEFFAN, supra note 39, at 37. "Mental reservation" is, in essence, an
unstated lie or a subtle method of evasion. The speaker knowingly misleads
another by her statement, but rationalizes the deception by adding a silent
mental qualifier that could make the statement true-the mental equivalent of
crossing one's fingers behind one's back in a effort to pardon a lie. See BOK,
LYING, supra note 21, at 35-37.
44. JOHN P. LOVELL, NEITHER ATHENS NOR SPARTA? THE AMERICAN SER-
VICE ACADEMIES IN TRANSITION 248 (1979).
45. John McCain, Senator from Arizona and presidential candidate,
chose not to compete in the early Iowa caucus for the Republican presidential
nomination in 2000. He instead planned to focus his campaign efforts on a
strong finish in the South Carolina primary, where high concentrations of
active-duty and retired military personnel would be particularly respectful of his
service as a Vietnam-era naval aviator and five-year prisoner of war. See Edwin
Chen, McCain Pins Presidential Hopes on Fellow Veterans; Politics: Arizona Republican
Senator, a Celebrated Former POW, Aims for Tactical Victories in a Few Key States, L.A.
TIMES, June 28, 1999, at Al. Charleston, South Carolina is also the home of
The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, where Shannon Faulkner's
lawsuit led to integration of the previously all-male institution. See Faulkner v.
Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995).
46. Perjury Hearing, supra note 2, at 140 (statement of Rep. Bob Inglis).
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leave the military prematurely.4 7 In this admiral's words, there is
now a "tendency to see the rationale that is being put forth here
on the insignificance of lying and the insignificance of adul-
tery... being used as a defense, and in that manner it will under-
cut the good order and discipline"4 necessary to internal morale
and public respect.
The admiral's juxtaposition of contempt for lying and con-
tempt for adultery may begin to explain why a military that so
prides itself on instilling a powerful ethic of truthfulness can at
the same time operate under the policy of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell."49 Contrary to its popularized name, the policy requires
much more of gay servicemembers than simple abstention from
"telling" others about their sexual orientation. It requires active
and continuing deception in an effort to avoid triggering the
investigative mechanism set out by Department of Defense regu-
lation. The statutory ban itself is described in relatively specific
prohibitions of particular intimate conduct and particular state-
47. See id. at 106 ("it might affect the quality and the numbers that make
it a career") (testimony of Adm. Bud Edney). The admiral distinguished the
case of former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who was pardoned by
President George Bush after his indictment for false statements to Congress in
relation to the Iran-Contra affair, explaining that Weinberger's charged failure
to tell the truth would not affect servicemember morale because foreign policy
"is so much more complex to understand." Id. at 107; see also David Johnston,
The Pardons; Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinberger Trial; Prosecutor
Assails 'Cover-Up", N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
48. Pejury Hearing supra note 2, at 106 (testimony of Adm. Leon Edney).
Of course, whenever military witnesses appear before Congress, congressmen
who are military veterans sometimes engage in a bit of "me too" self-puffery in
support of their opinions. One example was the soliloquy of Representative
Steven Buyer, who was an Army Reserve lawyer called to duty during the Persian
Gulf War:
When military leaders, to include the Commander in Chief, fall
short of this idea, then there is confusion and disruption in the ranks.
And today many do see a double standard.
I am out there. I have been with the Marines. I have been with
the Third Fleet before they sailed.
Id. at 64. Military experience, inflated or not, however, remains a valuable
badge of legislative credibility in matters related to military service. See Diane
H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 HAIRv. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 66 (1999) (citing Rep.
Buyer's disproportionate influence and arguing that women are disadvantaged
by the underrepresentation of female veterans in Congress).
49. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). For an extensive treatment of the legisla-
tive history of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and its application in practice, see Diane
H. Mazur, Re-making Distinctions on the Basis of Sex: Must Gay Women Be Admitted to
the Military Even If Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 953 (1997) [hereinafter
Mazur, Re-making Distinctions]; Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique
of "Gays in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAvis L. Rxv. 223
(1996) [hereinafter Mazur, Unknown Soldier].
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ments related to sexual orientation;" any proceeding under the
statutory ban would presumably require evidence of the prohib-
ited conduct or statements. The circumstances that would trig-
ger an investigation designed to discover prohibited acts and
statements, however, are much more open-ended. While the
investigatory resources of the United States military cannot be
brought to bear on an individual solely on the basis of sheer
"rumor, suspicion, or capricious claim" that an individual is gay,
those same investigatory resources can be employed provided
there is "credible information" supporting a "reasonable belief'
that a statutory violation has occurred.5"
The relationship of the statutory ban itself to the scope of
investigation permissible to uncover a violation is analogous to
the relationship between evidence that is admissible at trial and
information that is subject to discovery. Information subject to
discovery need not be admissible at trial; it need only be relevant
and appear "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."52 The threshold of information that would
warrant investigation under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is likewise a
lower standard than the quantum of evidence necessary to sus-
tain a finding under the statutory ban.5" Credible information
that would qualify under this regulatory scheme is so routine, so
much the content of normal day-to-day living, however, that it
could only be concealed through exhaustive deception. In prac-
50. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1) prohibits "a homosexual act," defined in 10
U.S.C. § 654(f) (3) as "any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively per-
mitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires." I describe the section as "relatively" specific because it also includes as
prohibited conduct any bodily contact "which a reasonable person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in" a homosexual
act. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1) (1998). The statute also requires discharge from the
military if a servicemember "has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisex-
ual, or words to that effect." 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2).
51. Enlisted Administrative Separations (Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries
into Homosexual Conduct), Dep't of Defense Directive 1332.14, enc. 4, § C (Bases
for Conducting Inquiries) (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Guidelines for Fact-Find-
ing Inquiries].
52. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(b)(1).
53. "Credible information" is intended to be a much lower standard than
"probable cause" that a violation has occurred. See Assessment of the Plan to Lift
the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before the Military Forces and Person-
nel Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 210 (1993) (testi-
mony of Hon. Jamie S. Gorelick, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
Provided the information is anything more substantive than "rumor, suspicion,
or capricious claim," investigation is justified. See Guidelines for Fact-Finding
Inquiries, supra note 51, § C.
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tical application, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"5 4  requires ser-
vicemembers to continually conceal everyday information about
what they do, where they go, and whom they see, far exceeding
the scope of information more directly associated with intimate
behavior. 5 To keep secret the latter is difficult enough; to keep
secret the former is to change the catch phrase of the policy to
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Lie Consistently." The policy's prohibi-
tion of statements concerning sexual orientation is not its most
intrusive burden:
Rather, it involves making truly unremarkable disclosures,
such as with whom one goes grocery shopping, shares a
checking account, takes a vacation; . . . from whom one
receives a phone call, a message, or flowers on one's birth-
day; and with or without whom one goes home for the
holidays.
Conversely, it can be these pedestrian yet very per-
sonal aspects of a life that remain hidden when one is clos-
eted-far less interesting to some, but far more real and
pervasive in the lives of most gay, lesbian, or bisexual per-
sons, than revelations about "propensity," "prohibited con-
duct," or "homosexual acts," with which the leaders of the
armed forces and Congress profess to be so concerned and
appear, to some, to be so obsessed.5 6
54. Those who fail to understand how difficult it can be to live under
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" are prone to use the phrase in a trivial, humorous fash-
ion. See, e.g., George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; Samaranch Must Take the Blame for
the Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at D4 (describing the unstated policy under
which International Olympic Committee delegates were given improper finan-
cial inducements during the site selection process as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").
The policy is anything but amusing
55. See Mazur, Unknown Soldier, supra note 49, at 246-48 (describing the
inescapable ordinariness of "credible information" that a servicemember is
gay); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S.
Military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BRooK. L. REv. 1141, 1154 (1997)
(describing a typical conversation between servicemembers about weekend
diversions-"What did you do this weekend?"-that may require lying to avoid
investigation under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"). Gay people can serve in the mili-
tary "only on condition that they acquiesce in lies-indeed, that they lie
actively-about the most personal aspects of their lives and their identities. The
new policy does more than mandate mere silence; it compels gay ser-
vicemembers to make involuntary and false affirmations of a heterosexual iden-
tity that is not their own." Wolff, supra, at 1144.
56. Kay Kavanagh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure
Denied, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 142, 154 (1995). In contrast, the military's
perspective on the lives of its gay servicemembers is distinctly unimaginative.
While Department of Defense policy may not protect servicemembers from the
consequences of these "unremarkable" disclosures, it does purport to allow the
more frivolous diversions of going to gay bars, reading gay magazines, and
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Federal appellate opinions have recognized the fundamen-
tal inconsistency of establishing a forced system of deception
within a culture that strongly values an ethic of truth; however,
that recognition has been left to those in dissent or to those later
reversed.
Common sense suggests that a policy of secrecy, indeed
what might be called a policy of deception or dishonesty,
will call unit cohesion into question.
If there is one thing that is undisputed and seems self-
evident, it is that cohesion depends on mutual trust within
the unit. The honor code for servicemembers provides
that they will not lie or cheat, and for good reason. Hon-
esty is a quality that attracts respect. Secrecy and deception
invite suspicion, which in turn erodes trust, the rock on
which cohesion is built.
The policy of the Act is not only inherently deceptive.
It also offers powerful inducements to homosexuals to
lie.
57
As Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit observed in dis-
sent, "[I] t is difficult to see how the military can benefit from a
policy fraught with such patent disingenuousness. 'Don't Ask,
Don't Tell' seems entirely inconsistent with the proud traditions
of our armed services, with the slogans such as Duty, Honor,
Country, [and] the Honor Codes ... ."" Gay servicemembers
are therefore doubly condemned: condemned for a charged
breach of sexual morality and then condemned for the lie they
are forced to construct. "By forcing only gays to lie about their
identities in a culture in which lying is held to be deeply dishon-
orable, the military inculcates in them a conception of them-
selves as second-class citizens, not only because of their
homosexuality, but also because of their duplicity."59 One has to
marching in gay rights parades. "Such activity, in and of itself, does not provide
evidence of homosexual conduct." Guidelines for Fact-Finding Inquiries, supra
note 51, § C(3)(d).
57. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated
and remanded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996), on remand, 968 F. Supp. 850
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (1998); see also Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915, 953 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Hall,J., dissenting) ("Another incongruity
of the 'unit cohesion' hypothesis behind 'don't tell' is that it encourages lying
in the interest of building and maintaining 'bonds of trust' among the troops.
A relationship built on deception is anything but a 'bond of trust.'").
58. Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir.
1997) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
59. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Pre-
sumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE L.J. 485, 548 (1998).
Although Professor Yoshino seems to understand the dilemma faced by gay ser-
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suspect that when an institution's ethic related to honesty and
truthfulness becomes conflicted and hypocritical, another moti-
vation is at hand. With respect to the military, its ability to moral-
ize about intimate conduct of which it disapproves is
strengthened by association of that conduct with breach of an
ethic of truthfulness.
III. TRUTH AND THE LAw
How does one measure the importance of truth to justice?
In the context of President Clinton's impeachment hearings, its
significance could not have been greater. Members of the major-
ity stressed that witnesses in a court of law must be bound by an
enforceable obligation to speak the truth; witnesses who with-
hold truth can "destroy the case of a fellow American citizen"6"
and weaken the underlying rule of law:
Because the rule of law-if you look at Auschwitz-do you
see what happens when the rule of law doesn't prevail?
Now, I do not leap from the Oval Office on a Saturday
afternoon to Auschwitz, but there are similarities when the
rule of law does not obtain, or where you have one law for
the powerful and one for the nonaristocratic. That is what
we are discussing, the significance of the oath, the signifi-
cance of truth, the breach of promise when someone lies
to you having raised their hand and sworn to tell the whole
truth.
61
At the same time, others question whether the telling of
truth is a necessary, expected, or even aspirational component of
the legal system under contemporary interpretations of legal eth-
ics in practice. This competing perspective on the significance of
honesty and truthfulness in law, however, is one that concerns
statements made not by lay witnesses, 2 but by the system's pro-
fessional participants. Robert Nagel speaks of lawyers, not liti-
vicemembers forced to lie in service to country, I strenuously disagree with his
conclusion that they have thereby "disavowed" the gay community. Id. at 545.
60. Perjury Hearing, supra note 2, at 109 (statement of Rep. George W.
Gekas).
61. Id. at 116 (statement of Rep. HenryJ. Hyde).
62. Professor Alan Dershowitz, one of the legal experts called to testify
during the congressional perjury hearing, highlighted the inconsistency with
which the legal system tolerates dishonesty even with respect to witness testi-
mony. Dershowitz focused on the practice now termed "testilying," in which
law enforcement personnel testify falsely and judges and prosecutors look the
other way, usually in the cause of establishing the constitutionality of searches
and seizures. "[Y]et there is little apparent concern to remedy that serious
abuse of the oath to tell the truth, even among those who now claim to be so
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gants, when he criticizes the general legal ethic of truthfulness,
or untruthfulness: "It is not too much to say that we have a legal
system that from top to bottom is built in significant part on half-
truths, exaggerations, distortions, omissions, and falsehoods."6
In contrast to the nominally consistent ethical standard of
truthfulness that prevails within the military-at least the stan-
dard that prevails other than in matters of sexual morality-the
institution of law struggles constantly with its inconsistent
approach to the significance of honesty. Not only does the law
permit quibbling by its professional members, it demands quib-
bling, if not knowing misrepresentation, in the service of repre-
senting clients zealously. Under a professional ethic (of sorts)
that accepts the necessity of misrepresentation in the course of
effective advocacy, it is, for example, "understandable" to a fed-
eral court of appeals that judicial sanction for a court brief flatly
misrepresenting the state of existing law would cause "complete
consternation in the practicing bar which sees vigorous advocacy,
seemingly without regard to its possible misrepresentations to
the court, as the hallmark of aggressive and justified representa-
tion of the client."
64
concerned with the corrosive influences of perjury on our legal system." Id. at
86.
William Pizzi has offered the more provocative argument that testilying is
an understandable response to erratic judicial interpretation of an exclusionary
rule that expects law enforcement officers to arrive at "correct" Fourth Amend-
ment decisions on the street under circumstances in which even judges would
reasonably disagree about what the "correct" decision should have been. See
WiLLiAM T. Pizzi, TRILus WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRi-
ALS HAs BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WtiAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD
IT 37-42 (1999). "In short, a system with harsh rules becomes less honest all
around as we struggle to avoid the harshness of the rules." Id. at 39; see also
Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996) (advocating replacement of the exclusionary rule
with a damages remedy to reduce the incentive for testilying); Christopher
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 363
(same).
63. Robert F. Nagel, Lies and Law, 22 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 605, 615
(1999).
64. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540
& n.4 (9th Cir. 1986), revg 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (quoting Sanctions:
Rule 11 and Other Powers, 1986 A.B.A. SECTION OF LrrIGATION 8). In dissenting
from a denial of hearing en banc, several judges expressed their exasperation at
the ubiquitous practice of misrepresentation by lawyers:
We should also take into account that district courts, more than appel-
late courts, are plagued by misrepresentations. We face them on occa-
sion, but common report has it that some trial lawyers are much less
scrupulous with trial judges, who do not have the staff or time an
appellate tribunal has to unmask misrepresentation.
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Some readers at this point might already strongly object to
my unsympathetic characterization of the legal system's ethic of
honesty and truthfulness, as did several of my colleagues with
whom I shared the ideas that follow; nonetheless, I stand by its
pointedness. One experienced practitioner who recently
entered the profession of teaching law has expressed his similar
disappointment: "It never fails to astonish me how many attor-
neys who are truly decent people-who would give strangers the
shirts off their backs-will also routinely . . .draft misleading
answers to interrogatories or misrepresent the holdings of
cases."
65
The depreciation of the ethic of honesty begins in law
school. Law students are often unable to distinguish the differ-
ence between alternative inferences from fact or law, which presuma-
bly the first-year skill of "thinking like a lawyer" should enable
them to discern, and misrepresentation of fact or law, which ethical
constraints ought to discourage. The two become one and the
same, with the inevitable lesson to law students that there are
always two arguments to be made, two versions of facts to be
found, and two interpretations of existing law to be discovered.
Instead of learning to recognize those circumstances in which,
on the merits of fact and law, there is only one reasonable and
just determination, students learn to believe that "such a thing
cannot be .... [T]he law must (be made to) say what our side
needs it to say!"66
One example from my own experience as a moot-court
judge in a law school appellate advocacy competition illustrates
this potential gap in ethical education. The appellate question at
issue was one of Fourth Amendment law: had a minor, a ten-year
old boy, validly consented to a search of the residence he shared
with his father? One of the facts in the record students should
have used in arguing their respective positions was that the son
had, in the past, missed a year of school for health reasons. The
fact was significant because the validity of the child's consent
depended on the police officer's reasonable belief that the child
shared joint authority over the home. While the boy was only a
fourth grader, he seemed much older in appearance, and the
reasonableness of the officer's subjective evaluation of the child's
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 584-85 (9th Cir.
1987) (Noonan, Sneed, Anderson, and Kozinski, JJ., dissenting from denial of
hearing en banc).
65. PatrickJ. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law
School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 729
(1998).
66. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 15 (1988).
SEX AND LIES
age, maturity, and intelligence would be the measure of valid
consent. 67 I was stunned to find students using this fact in a
truth-adjusted fashion to argue that the boy must have been lack-
ing in intelligence because he had been held back a year in
school. When, in my role as judge, I asked whether the record
showed that the reason for the delayed advancement was illness
and not academic deficiency, what I received in return (coupled
with an embarrassed almost-smirk) was a concession that I was
right, offered with an air of "OK, you got me-all I can do is try."
When law students are taught legal analysis without an
accompanying ethic of truth, they develop an approach to the
practice of law that can obscure professional responsibilities.
"When we treat language and facts as infinitely manipulable, we
encourage our students to misrepresent law and misstate fact-
indeed, we teach them that there is no such thing as misrepre-
senting law and misstating fact. '68 It is essential that students
understand the difference between facts seen from a client's stand-
point and facts seen from the standpoint of a client's interest. The
former simply ensures that the client's perspective on relevant
events is heard; the latter, in contrast, is the lawyer's version of
67. See, e.g., Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1993).
68. Schiltz, supra note 65, at 779. Professor Schiltz believes that law
professors without significant experience in the practice of law are less likely to
impart an ethic of truthfulness to their students.
Although it would be difficult to prove, I suspect that professors who
have practiced law-who have spent several years helping real people
with real problems-are more likely to "eschew the bloodless relativ-
ism that implicitly teaches students to regard law as a game akin to
'switch sides' as played in high school and college debating societies."
Id. at 782 (quoting Alan Hirsch, The Moral Failure of Law Schools, TRoliK, Nov.-
Dec. 1996, at 31, 33). I'm not sure that I would agree with his assessment. Law
professors with and without significant practice experience-and lawyers in
practice-range along the spectrum of professional honesty. I believe one of
the realities of the practice of law that disappoints new graduates is the realiza-
tion that very little of their work relates to the merits of the matter at issue.
In addition, one should always be careful about a conclusion that depends
on the assumption there is "no such thing" as the matter in question, as in there
is "no such thing" as misrepresenting law and misstating fact under the
demands of zealous advocacy. Often the assumption there is "no such thing" is
a substitute for fair analysis of whether "such thing" really exists. Diane H.
Mazur, Women, Responsibility, and the Military, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 16-17
(1998) 1987 (critiquing the simplicity of the assumption that there is "no such
thing" as a consensual sexual relationship between a man and a woman at dif-
ferent levels of the workplace hierarchy); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's
"Different Mission ": Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 125, 136 (1987) (critiquing the assumption that there is "no such thing"
as a false defense in a criminal trial; truth is more than "what the trier of fact
determines it to be").
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reverse engineering. "Starting from the standpoint of the cli-
ent's interest, the adversarial lawyer reasons backward to what
"169the facts must be ....
The rule of professional responsibility governing "candor
toward the tribunal" requires that lawyers "shall not know-
ingly.., make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribu-
nal."7 How, then, did we arrive at a practice so distant from
principle under such a straightforward ethical expectation?71
David Luban and William Simon have each written thoughtful
critiques of ethical rules governing the practice of law that devote
prominent attention to the listless status of a lawyer's ethic of
69. LUBAN, supra note 66, at 73; see also Mazur, supra note 48, at 49-50
(criticizing the employment of "standpoint epistemology" in legal scholarship
concerning women in the military because it encourages departure from factual
context; military women are characterized primarily as sexual victims rather
than as professional servicemembers).
70. MODEL RuuEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1983).
Some would contend that the requirement that a lawyer's false statements be
made "knowingly" gives enormously wide, perhaps infinitely wide, latitude to
misrepresent fact and law before the court. Who, after all, knows anything with
absolute certainty? Under this interpretation, a lawyer is acting ethically and
honorably even if he has no reason whatsoever to believe what he states is (or
even could be) true, provided it is still possible he does not know it is false.
Furthermore, the traditionally zealous advocate might argue that nothing is
known to be false until the judge decides it is false. "[ O ] nly the judge's good
faith determination of the case counts, and you do not yet know what that will
be." LuBAN, supra note 66, at 27 (describing and refuting this viewpoint). In an
application that sullies the alleged words of Yogi Berra, Luban refers to this
ethical evasion as "[t]he trial ain't over 'til it's over" excuse. Id.
Sissela Bok dismisses the argument that "since we can never know the truth
or falsity of anything anyway, it does not matter whether or not we lie when we
have a good reason for doing so." Boy, LYING, supra note 21, at 12. She finds
the argument unsupportable for an entirely practical reason: most who would
advance it have no trouble distinguishing falsehood from truth in their daily
lives in any context other than their professional one. See id. at 11-13. Still,
lawyers try. Who knows beyond doubt whether a client is guilty of the crime
charged? See David N. Yellen, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" or Acting Like a Judge?: A
Response to Professor Simon, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 13, 17 (1998). This contention,
however, is itself misleading. Most misrepresentations made by lawyers will con-
cern specific underlying facts and inferences from those facts, not global, exis-
tential conclusions of guilt and innocence. The truth or falsity of underlying
facts and inferences are more often "knowable" by the lawyers who argue them.
71. The ethical obligation of Rule 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting false statements
to a tribunal, offers the closest analogy to the legal obligation of a witness to tell
the truth in testimony before a tribunal. While other professional obligations
involve an ethic of truthfulness, such as the remaining sections of Rule 3.3 and
Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Article confines its discussion to
false statements, in keeping with its overall theme.
honesty and truthfulness.7 2 Luban has observed the same sense
of departure between principle and practice in a conflicted sys-
tem that purports to prohibit false statements of fact or law while
demanding that fact and law be manipulated to an instrumental-
ist end. "For the lawyer's art is to manipulate arguments about
law and fact (within the established [ethical] constraints . . .) to
bend, fold, and spindle, if not mutilate, the facts and law."73 The
distinction between truth and falsity becomes blurred, in the
context of legal advocacy, into a hybrid concept of "versions" of a
legal dispute that may retain only a tenuous connection to the
facts and law originally at hand. In Luban's view, however, the
assumption that competitive comparison of two "versions" of an
event leads to an accurate and reasonable resolution "comes
close to the undergraduate fallacy of thinking that because every-
one has a right to her opinion, everyone's opinion is equally
likely to be right. Although frequently there are versions of the
truth, truth does not necessarily come in versions."74
Simon similarly disputes the assumption that biased presen-
tation of arguments that are skewed by adversarial inaccuracy is
somehow the clearest path to truth. He offers instead a model of
legal ethics in which ethical decisionmaking can, and should,
turn on a lawyer's evaluation of the underlying merits of a case,
which of necessity relies on an ethic of truthfulness.75 As one of
his illustrative examples, Simon examines one of the standard
teaching hypotheticals in the study of legal ethics: cross-examina-
tion of the truthful witness.7 6 Is it ethical, so asks this hypotheti-
cal, for a lawyer to cross-examine a witness in a manner that
invites the jury to draw an inference that the cross-examiner
knows is false or, more specifically, an inference that the witness
is lying when the cross-examiner knows the witness is truthful?
Simon concludes that this misleading form of cross-examination
would be improper because it works at cross-purposes to "truth as
the central goal of adversary advocacy." 77 "The practice thus
amounts to deliberate deception, and it is difficult to see how it
72. See LUBAN, supra note 66; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE:
A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998); William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Law-
yer" About Ethical Questions, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1998).
73. LUBAN, supra note 66, at 13.
74. Id. at 72; see also Subin, supra note 68, at 136 ("it makes sense to char-
acterize what emerges as 'truth' only if information, rather than 'disinforma-
tion,' is presented to the arbiter").
75. See SIMON, supra note 72, at 138.
76. See id. at 143 (discussing example of deceptive impeachment of truth-
ful handwriting expert); Simon, supra note 72, at 8 (discussing example of
deceptive impeachment of truthful eyewitness).
77. Simon, supra note 72, at 7.
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could make any general contribution to an accurate factual
determination. "78
Not surprisingly, one of the more common versions of the
hypothetical concerning cross-examination of the truthful wit-
ness involves cross-examination of the truthful rape victim by the
defendant's lawyer. 79 In its traditional form, prior to the enact-
ment of rape-shield evidentiary rules that now prohibit evidence
of the sexual character of victims of sexual assault,80 the hypo-
thetical asks whether the cross-examiner should question the
complainant about her "scandalous" sexual behavior with
another man in an effort to cast doubt on her credibility.81 The
"correct" answer, under the dominant understanding of adver-
sarial ethics, is that the cross-examiner must use the information
to discredit the witness, however irrational and prejudicial the
exercise; anything less would be a failure of professional respon-
sibility.8 2 Even David Luban, an ethics scholar who generally
condemns the prevalence of misrepresentation in legal argu-
ment, had a difficult time justifying an ethical prohibition of
impeachment on the basis of sexual character.8 3
78. Id. at 8; see also Subin, supra note 68, at 145 (noting "the utterly arbi-
trary line we have drawn between deliberately offering perjured testimony and
deliberately attempting to create false 'proof' by offering truthful but mislead-
ing evidence, or by impeaching a truthful witness").
79. One teacher and writer in the field of evidence has noted the dispro-
portionate number of hypotheticals in one particular evidence casebook that
involved women as sexual objects, women as victims of violence, or combina-
tions of the two. The casebook in question was later revised substantially in
response to the critique. See Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, The Devious Prosti-
tute, and Other Stories From the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 914 (1994).
80. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412.
81. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAwyERs' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
44 (1975); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1474-75
(1966) (justifying an ethical obligation to discredit a truthful witness). Harry
Subin once represented a criminal defendant in a case that presented the real-
life version of the standard hypothetical. He chose not to cross-examine a
truthful rape victim on the basis of her consensual behavior with others, a deci-
sion he made out of conscience but believed was probably a violation of his
ethical obligation to the client. See Subin, supra note 68, at 135.
82. See FREEDMAN, supra note 81, at 48-49.
83. See LUBAN, supra note 66, at 150-52. Luban ultimately concluded that
cross-examination of the victim on the basis of sexual character was "morally
wrong," primarily on the basis of women's institutional disadvantage in a patri-
archal system. Id. He misses the importance of an ethic of truthfulness, how-
ever, when he confuses the right to zealous representation with the right to
misrepresentation: "Thus, if cross-examining the victim about her sex life is a
morally permissible part of the advocate's zeal when the accused is innocent,
the same is true when he is guilty." Id. at 151. The difference is that one cir-
cumstance requires misrepresentation and the other does not.
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The association of sexual character evidence with issues of
credibility, honesty, and truthfulness has been a tenacious one
over time. Historically, the connection between female sexuality
and character for truthfulness has been quite direct. Women
with "poor" sexual character lacked credibility not only because
they exhibited a propensity or interest in sexual relations, 4 but
also because their general character for truthfulness was deemed
deficient as well.8 5 Impeachment on the basis of sexual character
evidence allowed courts of law to be used as government-spon-
sored forums for some of the rankest instances of sexual
moralizing.
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
supplemented by a rape-shield bar in 1978, signaled through a
variety of its provisions a conscious choice to eliminate the use of
sexual character evidence in the courtroom. The ability to prove
a case on the basis of the sexual character of the parties or their
witnesses has always been of particular concern to women, who
are likely to be disproportionately harmed by allegations of poor
sexual character:
Certainly, women's experiences before the enactment of
Rape Shield laws serve as a warning of how "character" evi-
dence can be used as an oppressive tool. Support for the
idea of "character evidence" in one context may lead to
application in other contexts that injure women ...
Indeed, the whole notion of relying on "character" runs
counter to the historical experience of women. Women
branded with bad or "loose" character in rape cases must
86be leery of our culture's collective intuition.
IV. TRUTH AND SEXUAL MORALITY
At times there seems to be something intoxicating about the
latitude to moralize about sexual matters through the power of
law, which is why, in most instances, rules of evidence close the
door to the tactic. Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
the most prominent example because it addresses the subject
matter most directly: the rule excludes, in both criminal and civil
cases involving claims of sexual misconduct, evidence of the
alleged victim's "other sexual behavior" or sexual predisposi-
84. See 1AJoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRILS AT COMMON LAw §§ 62,
62.1 (Tillers rev. 1983).
85. See 3A JOHN H. WGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TtuALS AT COMMON LAw
§§ 924, 924a (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
86. Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence
in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 690-91 (1998).
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tion.17 The rule permits only a few narrow exceptions for evi-
dence of other sexual conduct-not general predisposition,
reputation, or opinion-that is directly related to proof of the
charged incident.8 The intent of the rule is to eliminate entirely
the historical practice of using a woman's sexual character as a
means of proving either her behavior or her credibility. 89 It
denies a defendant accused of sexual misconduct the latitude to
moralize about his accuser's sexual history and, furthermore, to
engage the fact-finder in a group effort in moralizing about
sexuality.
Another evidentiary rule severs the connection between dis-
favored sexual behavior and character for truthfulness in a much
more subtle, but still effective and essential way. Rule 608(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence permits testifying witnesses to be
cross-examined about prior specific instances of lying or other
deceptive behavior or, in the language of the rule, specific
instances of conduct that are "probative of truthfulness."9 The
purpose of the rule is to give the fact-finder additional informa-
tion with which to determine the witness's present credibility.
The inference is a simple one. The fact-finder is permitted to
infer that an individual who has lied before is more likely to be
lying in his or her present testimony.9 '
87. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
88. FED. R. EVID. 412(b).
89. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 294-
97 (2d ed. 1999).
90. FED. R. EvID. 608(b). If the witness denies the deceptive conduct, the
cross-examiner must accept the answer. Rule 608(b) does not permit the intro-
duction of other "extrinsic" sources of evidence to contradict the witness'
denial, such as a document or the testimony of another witness.
An analogous common-law evidentiary principle prevents "opening your
own door" to the manufacture of untruthfulness in the courtroom. Under this
principle, a cross-examiner cannot ask a question that is inappropriate under
the rules of evidence and later contradict any lies the witness tells in response,
even if the witness' lawyer failed to object to the question. The cross-examiner
must accept the witness' answer in evidence, even if it is a lie. The principle
against "opening your own door" in effect excuses lying for the greater good of
preventing inappropriate inquiries. See United States v. Reed, 44 M.J. 825
(A.F.C.C.A. 1996) (military law opinion) (excluding evidence of defendant's
sexual aggressiveness following defendant's denial that he had ever been sexu-
ally aggressive; the question attempted to solicit inadmissible propensity evi-
dence, and therefore the prosecutor must live with the denial).
91. Rule 608(b) therefore permits a line of "propensity" reasoning that is
otherwise largely prohibited by the Rules. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(a), evidence of an individual's character or trait of character, whether in
the form of opinion, reputation, or instances of prior conduct, is not admissible
to prove that individual's conduct on a specific occasion. Rule 404(a) contains
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The potential for abuse of Rule 608(b) as an instrument for
moralizing about sexual conduct is apparent. 92 Although a wit-
ness could not be directly discredited by cross-examination into
his or her sexual history because sexual behavior in and of itself
is not an act of deception or falsity,9" any non-conforming sexual
history is no doubt accompanied by some falsehoods intended to
avoid societal disapproval. While, for example, a cross-examiner
could not discredit a witness in open court by asking, "Haven't
you committed acts of adultery (or fornication, or homosexual-
ity)?," the cross-examiner could presumably ask, "Haven't you
lied to someone about your acts of adultery (or fornication, or
homosexuality) ?" Provided the cross-examiner had a reasonable
or good-faith basis for the question,94 which would almost cer-
tainly be the case in all instances of adultery and would likely be
the case with respect to other non-conventional sexual behavior,
given our current climate of judgment, the question seems tech-
nically proper under the rule. From the perspective of the wit-
ness, however, questions concerning lies about sexual behavior
are just as intrusive as questions about sexual behavior itself.
Whatever the form of the question, furthermore, the court is
equally abused as a forum for sexual moralizing.
several relatively narrow exceptions, one of which is proof of a testifying witness'
character for truthfulness under Rule 608.
92. Interestingly, Rule 608(b) was the subject of little debate prior to its
enactment and has been the subject of little scholarly attention in the years
since. See Robert Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal
Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 ViIL. L. REV. 533, 544 (1992) (noting that Rule
608 codified existing evidentiary common law). Almost all scholarly attention
with respect to impeachment on the basis of character for truthfulness is
devoted to Rule 609, which permits impeachment by prior convictions, and its
effect on criminal defendants. See FED. R. EVID. 609. A recent colloquy on char-
acter impeachment evidence offered no substantive mention of Rule 608, even
though the rule is more open-ended than Rule 609 in that any prior act in the
witness' life, if "probative of truthfulness," is a potential subject for cross-exami-
nation. See Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian
[!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REv. 637 (1991); Richard D.
Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction Between Per-
sonality and Situation, 43 DuKE L.J. 816 (1994); H. Richard Uviller, Credence,
Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DuKE L.J. 776
(1993); H. Richard Uviller, Unconvinced, Unreconstructed, and Unrepentant: A Reply
to Professor Friedman's Response, 43 DuKE L.J. 834 (1994). Under Rule 608(b), the
act need not have led to conviction; the act need not even be criminal in
nature. Nonetheless, there has been relatively little interest in defining the
scope of acts which are "probative of truthfulness," the primary limitation
under the rule.
93. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 89, at 549.
94. See id. at 550.
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For these reasons courts have consistently construed Rule
608(b) to exclude instances of lying related to sexual conduct.
Litigants cannot bootstrap lies about sexual conduct into permis-
sible cross-examination if the original conduct was not probative
of truthfulness itself.95 One court's comments in 1976 concern-
ing an attempt to impeach a witness through accusations of adul-
tery are both illustrative and oddly prescient of current events:
In these times of recorded and widely publicized Presiden-
tial and Congressional adulterers, massage parlors with
neon signs, and street comer pandering, which claims con-
stitutional protection, we suspect that many of our jurors
selected within a fifty mile radius of Foley Square are licen-
tious, or have friends who are. Moss neither raped nor
seduced Miss Gold; the activities of these mature con-
senting adults would not, in our view, if known to the jury,
impeach any witness.9 6
Military courts have interpreted the scope of Rule 608(b) in
similar fashion.97 The military's practice of prohibiting impeach-
ment based on the type of lie that typically accompanies non-
conforming sexual activity, however, is an even stronger state-
ment of principle on the danger of bootstrapping issues of
morality into issues of credibility. The statement is stronger
because, with respect to witnesses who are servicemembers, the
disfavored conduct is often also criminal.9" Nonetheless, military
95. See 3A JOHN H. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 982
(Chadbourn rev. 1970) (concluding that adultery was not probative of charac-
ter for truthfulness); see also Charles W. Collier & Christopher Slobogin, Terms of
Endearment and Articles of Impeachment, 51 FLA. L. REV. 615, 640 (1999) (conclud-
ing, with respect to President Clinton's impeachment controversy, "something
unimportant (that is, 'private') is not converted into something important (that
is, 'public') just because someone lies about it"); Miguel A. M~ndez, The Law of
Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 230 (1996) (eval-
uating the behavioral predictiveness of different theories of personality to
explain why, for example, "an individual who cheats on his spouse might not lie
under oath").
96. United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also
United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (homosexuality not
probative of truthfulness under Rule 608(b); "it is exactly the type of cross-
examination strategy . . . that impairs the search for the truth and harasses,
annoys or humiliates the witness in the process"); State v. Woodard, 404 S.E.2d
6 (N.C. App. 1991) ("Adultery is not the type of misconduct which falls under
Rule 608(b).").
97. Military Rule of Evidence 608(b) is substantively identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 608(b).
98. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1994) (sodomy); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES pt. IV, 62 (adultery), 69 (cohabitation, wrongful), 83 (frat-
ernization) (1998) [hereinafter COURTS-MARTIAL].
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courts do not permit impeachment on the basis of, for example,
adultery, even though adultery is punishable by dishonorable dis-
charge and imprisonment for as much as one year 99 and even
though "adultery by a married person involves deceit of, and
fraud upon, the aggrieved spouse."' 00
Significantly, the principle holds even when the witnesses
are female and perhaps still subject, in some minds, to the histor-
ical connection between non-conforming sexuality and truthful-
ness. Cross-examination of a female servicemember alleging that
she had posed nude for photographs and had engaged in pro-
miscuous sexual relationships has been barred as irrelevant to
her credibility and character for truthfulness:
Fornication is no more a barometer of untruthfulness than
celibacy is an indicator of truthfulness, and it is probable
that at least as many lies have been uttered by persons fully
clothed as by those who were nude. We therefore hold
that neither posing nude for photographs nor engaging in
an active sex life is an act of corruption which is probative
of a propensity for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
01
Members of the legal profession's bar, not surprisingly, have
taken a similar perspective on the connection between sexual
conduct in their own lives and the character for truthfulness nec-
essary for the ethical practice of law. Under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, "matters of personal morality, such as
adultery and comparable offenses, . . . have no specific connec-
tion to fitness for the practice of law" or to "dishonesty" or
"breach of trust.'
10 2
The one event that may have disturbed this settled under-
standing of Rule 608(b) and related issues concerning sexuality
and credibility, however, is the impeachment-related lawsuit of
Jones v. Clinton.1°3 The trial judge in Jones apparently misunder-
99. See COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 98, at pt. IV, 62.
100. United States v. Jacobs, 9 MJ. 794, 798 (N.C.M.R. 1980).
101. United States v. Duty, 16 M.J. 855, 857 (N-M.C.M.R. 1983). If femi-
nists who criticize the military were more aware of decisions such as Jacobs and
Duty that were protective of women's sexuality, their arguments might be less
reflexive. See Mazur, supra note 48.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 cmt. (1983).
Such a forgiving perspective was not always the case, of course. One applicant
to the Florida Bar during the 1960s was caught in the classic Catch-22 of sexual-
ity and credibility: he was denied admission to the bar not only for engaging in
homosexual conduct, but also for lying about the homosexual conduct. See Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946-
1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. Rxv. 703, 752-53 (1997).
103. 993 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. Ark. 1998), summary judgment granted, 990 F.
Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
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stood both the language and the intent of the rule when she sug-
gested that evidence of President Clinton's affair with Monica
Lewinsky was potentially relevant for purposes of cross-examina-
tion under Rule 608(b).1" 4 This statement was inaccurate and
probably served to feed the general public assumption that wit-
nesses can routinely be questioned about their sexual behavior in
an effort to attack their credibility.
When the evidentiary door to sexual character is left ajar
either by a misinterpretation of the applicable rules, as in Jones v.
Clinton, or by the unusual nature of the claims in a particular
case, the urge to moralize can raise an already adversarial level of
misrepresentation to new heights. One example can be seen in
Shahar v. Bowers,1" 5 a decision which permitted the state attorney
general in Georgia to revoke an offer of employment to a gradu-
ating law student after she disclosed her intention to enter into a
religious ceremony of commitment with a female partner. In
essence, Shahar's sexual character-and others' perceptions of
her sexual character-became an issue subject to proof in sup-
port of Bowers' contention that her life with another woman
impaired the ability of his office to enforce Georgia's sodomy
laws' 06 and to oppose issues such as same-sex marriage and
domestic partnership benefits. 10 7
In a pre-trial ruling denying the attorney general's motion to
dismiss, the court censured both the defendant and his lawyers
for what was apparently an alarming level of misrepresentation in
briefs filed with the court:
One particular problem has been a lack of complete hon-
esty in dealing with the court. Counsel are put on notice
that the court will demand complete intellectual and pro-
fessional honesty in reference to all arguments and author-
ities presented to this court. In a related matter, the court
also notifies defendant and defense counsel that if they
continue to promote improper arguments, the court will
not hesitate to sanction them with attorneys' fees under
104. Id. at 1219 & n.3. Judge Susan Webber Wright was commenting on
evidence of the affair itself, not evidence that President Clinton lied about the
affair. There is no colorable argument that an adulterous affair, in and of itself,
is probative of truthfulness. Part V of this Article discusses other errors in appli-
cation of the Federal Rules of Evidence that occurred during Jones v. Clinton,
particularly with respect to the treatment of character evidence under Rule 404.
105. 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).
106. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of Georgia's criminal prohibition of sodomy in a prosecution
brought by the same Michael J. Bowers).
107. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104-05.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Although the court has directed its com-
ments to both parties in this action, defense counsel is by
far the greater offender.
10 8
One of Bowers' ethical lapses was his persistent reference to addi-
tional "facts" that were not part of the plaintiff's complaint, even
though the matter was before the court on a motion to dismiss
on the pleadings alone. Those additional "facts," not unexpect-
edly, consisted of allegations and speculations concerning
Shahar's sexual behavior."0 9 The parties later agreed to limit dis-
covery of Shahar's sexual history and discovery of the names of
any law department employees believed to have engaged in sod-
omy or adultery, although that agreement did not prevent Bow-
ers from successfully arguing that Shahar's propensity to commit
sodomy justified his revocation of the employment offer. ° The
similarity of Bowers' reasoning to the reasoning of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" went unnoticed.
Furthermore, Bowers questioned Shahar's judgment.1
What had reflected poor judgment in Bowers' mind, though, was
not so much her relationship with another woman, but her fail-
ure to live that relationship in absolute secrecy. Her error,
according to the court, was in a lack of furtiveness in life's most
mundane aspects: "And, they, together, own the house in which
they cohabit. These things were not done secretly, but
openly." 2 As the colloquialism goes, they had her coming and
going. Had she made the decision to live furtively in the manner
endorsed by the state of Georgia, her secrecy would have
required a consistent level of lying designed to avoid disclosure
of any information suggesting the existence of a committed rela-
108. Shahar v. Bowers, No. 1:91-CV-2397-RCF, 1992 WL 220781, at *2
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 1992). Although the court addressed its remarks to both
parties, the opinion suggests that its ethical concerns were with the defendant.
Every instance of misrepresentation discussed by, the court was committed by
the attorney general. See id.
109. See id. ("this court has ignored (among other things) any reference
to plaintiffs sexual conduct").
110. See Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211, 213 (lth Cir. 1997); Shahar v.
Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1105 n.17 (11th Cir. 1997). Ironically, days after the
final judgment in Shahar's case, Bowers made a public apology for a long-stand-
ing adulterous relationship which, under Georgia law, was presumably criminal.
See Shahar, 120 F.3d at 212.
111. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101.
112. Id. at 1107; see also Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and
the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 237, 326 (1996) (describing the
"hiding, lying, and denying" necessary to avoid disclosure); Cynthia J. Frost,
Note, Shahar v. Bowers: That Girl Just Didn't Have Good Sense!, 17 LAW & INEQ. J.
57, 81-82 (1999) ("the clear message of the court is that gay and lesbian citizens
can achieve legitimacy only be secretive living").
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tionship. I assume that this repeated untruthfulness would have
also made Shahar unfit for service as a state's lawyer, should the
lies have been discovered. The ability to both engage in sexual
moralizing and effectively punish any lies made in response to
sexual moralizing is an unbeatable combination, particularly
when the forum for either, or both, is government-sponsored.11
The story of Pam Parsons' testimony before Congress is
analogous, although one would never have noted the similarity
from the transcript itself. Because Parsons cooperated with the
wishes of the majority by never revealing that her conviction for
perjury was related to a relationship with another woman, it was
easy to characterize her penitence as nothing more than regret
for perjury. Anyone who understood the circumstances behind
her words, however, would have realized her primary regret was
living as a closeted coach, which eventually led by a path of poor
judgment to her conviction and imprisonment: "Anything that I
ever denied about myself was what created a spiraling journey
through hell .... [T] o turn around and take a look at that other
side of me took more guts than it ever took to win a ball
game." '114 Parsons also cooperated with the wishes of the major-
ity by allowing them to re-establish a furtiveness she had dis-
carded long ago. During the hearing, the basis for her perjury
was referred to simply as "consensual sex," as if it involved some
unfortunate, deplorable, and forgettable incident. 115 No one
would hear that Parsons and the woman with which she had
"consensual sex" were still living together in a committed rela-
tionship, nearly twenty years later. No one would hear that they
both served a federal prison term.
116
Even under circumstances in which the ability to moralize
about matters of sex is diminished either because the legal sys-
113. There were reports during the investigation preceding Donna
Shalala's confirmation as the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was only interested in
whether she had ever lied about being gay, not in whether Shalala was actually
gay. See Ruthann Robson, The Specter of a Lesbian Supreme Court Justice: Problems of
Identity in Lesbian Theorizing, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 433, 449-50 (1993). If you
believe that, you will also believe that the special prosecutor was interested only
in whether ex-Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros lied about the amount of
financial support he gave his mistress, not in unearthing the details of their
adulterous relationship. See Neil A. Lewis, Long, Costly Case Against Cisneros Ends
in Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999, at Al (reporting Cisneros' plea of guilty
to one count of lying to the F.B.I. following a four-year investigation costing
$10,000,000).
114. Perjury Hearing supra note 2, at 6.
115. See id. at 11.
116. See Chandler, supra note 13.
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tern provides no means to punish the behavior directly or
because simple moral disapproval carries little weight, its associa-
tion with character for truthfulness remains. Punishment for dis-
honesty or lying can become a proxy for the unavailable avenue
of punishing disfavored sexual behavior; imposing a penalty for
lying about the behavior isjust another way of imposing a penalty
for the behavior itself. Contemporary emphasis on the signifi-
cance of "sexual lies" may, therefore, be little more than a subter-
fuge for investigation and judgment of non-conforming
sexuality.' 17 The only necessary ingredients are a forum that per-
mits the question to be asked and an enforcement mechanism
that allows penalties for lies in response.
V. THE RETURN OF SEXUAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE
In the context of President Clinton's impeachment, there
has been a near universal assumption that the sexual history and
sexual predisposition of defendants in sexual harassment cases
are properly open to review, at least with respect to sexual history
and sexual predisposition related to the workplace, if not more.
Congressmen, law professors, a federal judge, and an independ-
ent counsel alike-all trained in law and in evidence-agreed on
what they believed to be the obvious rule.
In [Jones v. Clinton] the judge ruled that the President was
required to testify, as in common in harassment cases and in
any sexual relations-about any sexual relations he had or
sought to have with any State or Federal employees within
a relevant time frame. This information is often necessary
for plaintiffs who bring civil rights sexual harassment cases,
for in order to prove those cases, especially when those-
when the harassing conduct occurred in private and is the
"he-said, she-said" situation. This information is used in court
to lend credibility to the plaintiffs case."
1" 8
117. See Laurence H. Tribe, And the Winner Is . N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 12,
1999, at A27 ("consensual private intimacies, even when they have secondary
public dimensions, fall uneasily if at all within the Government's powers to
investigate or to punish").
118. Perjury Hearing, supra note 2, at 32 (statement of Rep. Steven Buyer)
(emphasis added). Representative Buyer is also a lawyer with the Army Reserve,
and he has used his status as a veteran to enhance the credibility of his efforts to
limit opportunities for female servicemembers. He led the failed congressional
effort to re-segregate military basic training on the basis of sex. See Findings of
the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues and
Department of Defense Response: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of
the House Comm. on National Security, 105th Cong. (1998) (opening statement of
Rep. Steven Buyer, chair of the Military Personnel Subcommitee of the House
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All were certain that sexual harassment cases were somehow sui
generis; the usual rules of evidence would not apply The follow-
ing are just a few examples of the evidentiary assumptions that
were made: "[I]n the context of a sexual harassment lawsuit,
questions regarding intimate details of a person's life, protect-
able from disclosure in other circumstances, may be fair
game."" 9 "Sexual harassment law permitted the Jones deposition
questioning because that law recognizes that some curtailment of
privacy rights is necessary in order to remedy the unique and
harmful problems related to sexual harassment."12 ° "In short, a
defendant's sexual history, at least with respect to other employ-
ees, is ordinarily discoverable in a sexual harassment lawsuit."121
"[T] he questions posed to President Clinton are routinely asked
in sexual harassment cases each day around the country.
'
"122
Contrary to the above claims, there has never has been any
distinctive exception for sexual harassment claims that would
permit the general use of sexual character evidence or, in other
words, evidence offered to support an inference that if the
defendant has behaved inappropriately or promiscuously with
others, he is therefore more likely to have done so again with
respect to the charged offense. In fact, sexual character evi-
dence, like other forms of character evidence in general, is con-
trolled by a default rule of inadmissibility. One has to suspect
that when an evidence code designed to prohibit most uses of
sexual character begins to drift away from that purpose not by
design, but on the basis of disingenuous, misleading, and know-
ingly false argument, another motivation is at hand. Just as hypo-
critical concerns for honesty and truthfulness may serve as a
subterfuge for moralizing about sexual behavior, abuse of the evi-
dentiary rules governing character evidence may signal a similar
turn toward court-sponsored forums for morality judgments.
Two classes of the defendant's prior conduct are potentially
at issue in sexual harassment suits. A plaintiffs primary focus is
usually on prior instances in which the defendant has similarly
National Security Committee);JoINT COMM. ON PIrNnNG, U.S. CONGRESS, 1997-
1998 OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIREcrORY. 105TH CONGRESS 112 (1997).
119. Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries After the Clinton Sex Scandals,
22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 647, 684 (1999).
120. Id. at 686.
121. The Trial of the President: The Prosecution's Chronology; Untangling 'Colli-
sion'of Clinton, Jones, Lewinsky and Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at A13
(statement of Rep. Ed Bryant) (transcript as recorded by the Federal News
Service).
122. The Trial of the President: Presenting Article I; 'Pursuit of Truth, Seeking
Equal Justice and Upholding the Law', N.Y. TIME, Jan. 15, 1999, at Al5 (statement
of Rep. James Rogan) (transcript as recorded by the Federal News Service).
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engaged in sexually harassing conduct against other women in
the workplace. A second option, however, is to obtain evidence
of the defendant's consensual sexual relationships with work-
place colleagues or subordinates."' The latter appears useful for
two purposes, one substantive and one tactical. Consensual rela-
tionships can suggest a propensity for promiscuity, which
through a character inference makes the charged harassment
offense seem more likely. Disclosure of consensual relationships
can also generate embarrassment or, in the case of adulterous
conduct, can further threaten family relationships.124 It is impor-
tant to understand, however, that sexual histories of both a non-
consensual and a consensual nature are presumptively inadmissi-
ble for the same reason-they both generally depend on a pro-
hibited character inference for their relevance to the claim.
On a logical rather than an evidentiary basis, of course, we
have less trouble considering evidence of prior misconduct than
evidence of private consensual behavior, but the rules of evi-
dence have traditionally barred propensity proof despite that log-
ical relevance. Even if one finds it difficult to vigorously object to
proof of sexual harassment cases through the admission of prior
harassing conduct, the process of discovering that conduct has
come to permit extensive intrusions into private, consensual inti-
macy. Prevailing interpretations of the rules of evidence assume
that civil plaintiffs have the latitude to explore the sexual histo-
ries of civil defendants, under the justification that discovery is
the only way to determine whether any of those apparently con-
sensual intimacies might have incorporated a non-consensual
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons From a Debacle: From Impeachment to
Reform, 51 FLA. L. REv. 599, 613 (1999):
The problem that turned up is that in any case involving a sexual har-
assment allegation, it is apparently open to the plaintiff, at least in
some trial courts, to undertake fairly extensive discovery about the
consensual sexual activity of the defendant.... Now we do not know
the magnitude of the problem, but from talking with trial judges, I, at
least, have a sense that this is not a trivial problem.
124. When the defendant is a servicemember, civil discovery could also
reveal information leading to discharge. In Jones v. Commander, Kan. Army
Ammunitions Plant, Dep't of the Army, 147 F.R.D. 248 (D. Kan. 1993), the female
civilian plaintiff alleged acts of sexual harassment by her female military super-
visor, and she sought general discovery of the defendant's sexual preference,
habits, history, and behavior, apparently for the purpose of proving a homosex-
ual propensity. The court denied the request, holding that the relevant issue
was "whether or not the plaintiff was sexually harassed, not whether or not the
alleged perpetrator was or could have been sexually interested in the victim
because of the perpetrator's sexual preference." Id. at 252.
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element. 12 5 This contention, however, is wholly cavalier and flip,
one that would never justify similar intrusions under Rule 412 in
the hope that thorough discovery of women's sexual histories
might reveal past behavior that is in some way probative on the
facts of the present claim.'
2 6
It is interesting that we are experiencing a trend toward the
re-introduction of sexual character evidence just two decades
after the Federal Rules of Evidence sought to eradicate its use.
The same good reasons that justified strict limits on sexual char-
acter evidence, particularly the limits imposed by the rape-shield
rule, apply as well to some forms of character evidence now
sought from sexual harassment defendants. In the words of the
advisory committee drafting the most recent version of Rule 412,
the amendment that extended rape-shield protection to civil
cases: "The rule aims to safeguard . . . against the invasion of
privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is
associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and
the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process.
1 2 7
125. See APPENDICES TO THE REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 595(c)
SUBMITTED BY THE OFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, H.R. Doc. No. 105-
311, at 290 (1998) [hereinafter APPENDICES TO THE STARR REPORT] (summariz-
ing the discovery ruling issued by the trial court in Jones v. Clinton); Jane H.
Aiken, Sexual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining the Propensity Rule, 1997
Wis. L. REv. 1221, 1233 n.45.
126. See Aiken, supra note 125, at 1224 n.lI (noting that Rule 412 appro-
priately places similar limitations on excursions into sexual character during
the discovery process and during trial). In any event, it is unlikely that evidence
of the plaintiffs sexual history or predisposition unconnected to the events at
issue would have any probative value because its relevance would inevitably
depend on a prohibited propensity-based inference of promiscuity. Under
Rule 412, evidence of the victim's sexual character can be admitted in civil cases
only if "probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim
and of unfair prejudice to any party." FED. R. EVD. 412(b) (2). Sexual conduct
on the part of the victim that takes place within the scope of the events charged
in a sexual harassment claim, however, can be probative, and admissible, on the
issue of whether the defendant's sexual conduct was "welcomed" by the plain-
tiff. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986).
127. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. On rare occasion,
courts are responsive to the privacy concerns raised by general discovery into
the consensual sexual histories of sexual harassment defendants. "[Plaintiff]
essentially seeks a list of all the women [defendant] has worked with and slept
with; this overbroad inquiry would disclose the intimate details of several per-
sons' private lives without justification, and cannot be upheld." Boler v. Supe-
rior Court, 201 Cal. App. 3d 467, 474 (1987). It is ironic that advocates who are
concerned about court-sponsored intrusions into women's intimate lives can
lose that sensitivity in the context of discovery against sexual harassment
defendants. Certainly that discovery intrudes on the privacy interests of women
with whom the defendant has had consensual relationships; Rule 412 provides
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Any discussion should begin with a review of the applicable
rules of character evidence that apply when the "character" at
issue pertains to any traits other than one's inclination for truth-
telling, which is treated specially under the Rules.128 Rule 404 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence forms the fundamental structure
for determining the admissibility of character or "propensity" evi-
dence: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion ... ." As a result, to offer an
example, a plaintiff could not prove that the defendant shoved
her roughly by offering evidence that he had shoved others when
angry in the past, that others had a personal opinion that the
defendant was an assaultive or violent person, or that the defend-
ant had a reputation in the community as being an individual of
assaultive or violent character. The evidence would be inadmissi-
ble because its probativeness-its relevance-rests solely on char-
acter reasoning: that because the defendant had an assaultive or
violent propensity, it is therefore more likely that he behaved in
accordance with that propensity on the occasion in question and
shoved the plaintiff.
Rule 404(b) outlines permissible uses of an individual's
prior behavior for reasons that do not rely on character or pro-
pensity reasoning, for the rule does not necessarily bar the spe-
cific category of evidence (instances of prior conduct), but only
one specific use of that evidence (inferences based on character).
Therefore, although instances of prior conduct cannot be
offered "to prove the character of person in order to show action
in conformity therewith," they can be admitted for other pur-
poses, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
The intellectual exercise is in distinguishing character proof
from non-character proof, a distinction from which endless com-
mentary and case law arises.
Recently enacted Rule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
adds another permutation to the usual treatment of character
evidence under Rule 404. This 1995 addition to the Rules was
intended to directly contradict Rule 404 in the context of certain
specific civil cases, those "in which a claim for damages or other
relief is predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct
no protection to those who are not "victims" under the Rule. Sexual moralizing
through the power of law, even if undertaken in the name of women's interests,
always has the potential to disproportionately harm women. See Orenstein,
supra note 86, at 690-91.
128. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (referencing Rules 607, 608, and 609 as
pertinent to character for truthfulness of testifying witnesses).
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constituting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation. "129
The usual evidentiary ban on character reasoning is turned
upside down: evidence of prior offenses of sexual assault or child
molestation can be offered for the inference that an individual
who is by nature a sexual assaulter or a child molester is there-
fore more likely to have committed the similar charged acts. 3 '
This small but complex constellation of evidentiary rules has
somehow been transformed into simplistic assumptions concern-
ing the use of sexual character evidence against sexual harass-
ment defendants. Whenever an option to prove a case through
sexual character evidence is left open, there will always be a tre-
mendous temptation to offer it as a compelling addition to more
direct proof of the facts of the charged event. Scholars of evi-
dence have always ventured that Rule 404 prohibits proof in the
nature of "he's done it before, and so he's probably done it
again" not because it is irrelevant, but because it is perhaps too
relevant.' With respect to character evidence of a sexual
nature, prior conduct can assume disproportionate weight for
two reasons. First, as is the case with all character inferences,
fact-finders may overestimate the probativeness of prior conduct
in determining future behavior.132 Second, evidence of sexual
history invites fact-finders to engage in sexual moralizing and
punish litigants not for the events at issue, but for the nature of
the intimate lives they lead.
Character evidence limitations under the rules have been
stretched in two ways, through misinterpretation of the distinc-
tion between propensity and non-propensity forms of proof
under Rule 404 and through abuse of the discovery of evidence
under an already poorly drafted and poorly understood Rule
415. Taking Rule 404 first, one of the easiest ways to determine
that a court (or lawyer, or law professor) has little understanding
of how a propensity-based inference differs from a non-propen-
sity-based inference offered to prove, for example, "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
129. FED. R. EVID. 415. Rule 415 was enacted along with two other com-
panion provisions, Rules 413 and 414, which addressed evidence of similar
crimes in criminal sexual assault cases and criminal child molestation cases,
respectively. See FED. R. EvID. 413; FED. R. EVID. 414.
130. Evidence offered under the companion provisions of Rules 413, 414,
and 415 can be admitted and may be considered "on any matter to which it is
relevant," including for purposes of propensity. FED. R. EviD. 413.
131. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Rele-
vancy in Rape Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 563, 567 (1997).
132. See EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the Amer-
ican Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment off on the
Right Foot, 22 FoR)HAM URB. L.J. 285, 290-92 (1995).
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absence of mistake or accident," is that he or she is unable to
explain specifically how any of those purposes would be at issue
in the case. Instead, the court (or the advocate) reasons in con-
clusory fashion that the evidence must somehow fit (who knows
how?) at least one of a long line of permissible uses (who knows
which one?), therefore avoiding the character bar.133 Decisions
reached by this reasoning, unfortunately, are almost uniformly
wrong.
134
There are three standard uses of a defendant's prior acts of
sexual harassment which are properly admissible under the rules
of evidence. The common thread among all of them is that they
are offered to prove, and relevant to, something other than the
commission of the alleged act of sexual harassment. Because Rule
404(b) prohibits use of prior acts "to show action in conformity
therewith," prior incidents of sexually harassing conduct can only
133. SeeJones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (E.D. Ark. 1998) ("The
Court readily acknowledges that evidence of the Lewinsky matter might have
been relevant to plaintiffs case and, as she argues, that such evidence might
possibly have helped her establish, among other things, intent, absence of mis-
take, motive, and habit on the part of the President.") (footnote omitted). In
the context of President Clinton's denial that the alleged incident of sexual
crudeness took place, questions of mental state such as intent or absence of
mistake are not at issue; mental state is only at issue when the defendant con-
cedes the act but denies the necessary mental state. The assertion of "motive"
as a permissible purpose is only propensity proof dressed up in another name;
presumably, Jones' argument is that the Lewinsky evidence demonstrates that
Clinton has a "motive" to sexual harass employees. See also Kresko v. Rulli, 432
N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (applying the analogous Minnesota
version of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and excluding evidence of defend-
ant's consensual sexual behavior in part because none of the potential non-
propensity purposes under 404(b) was at issue). Compare the appropriate use
of prior domestic violence against the same victim to show that O.J. Simpson
had a motive-jealousy, bitterness, simple animosity-to kill his ex-wife. See
Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and
Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463 (1996). Lastly, sexual inclination cannot qualify
as the sort of specific, "semi-automatic" behavior, such as "going down a particu-
lar stairway two stairs at a time," contemplated by Rule 406. FED. R. EvD. 406
advisory committee's note.
134. Another common error in Rule 404(b) reasoning is to admit prior
acts for the purpose of enhancing the plaintiff's credibility or corroborating her
testimony. In this context, credibility or corroboration are just different words
for propensity; the plaintiffs credibility is enhanced, or her testimony corrobo-
rated, only because she has accused someone who already has a propensity for
the charged conduct. Cf Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 602 (7th Cir.
1985) (incorrectly admitting evidence of defendant's consensual and non-con-
sensual sexual conduct with other employees to corroborate plaintiffs testi-
mony and to "establish [defendant's] propensity to use his power... to sexually
exploit women") (emphasis added); Campbell v. Board of Regents, 770 F.
Supp. 1479, 1486 (D. Kan. 1991) (incorrectly admitting other incidents of sex-
ual harassment for credibility purposes under Rule 404(b)).
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be admitted to prove something short of, or less than, the
charged act of sexual harassment itself. Much as it might seem
appropriate to identify a particular defendant as a "sexual har-
asser" who has continued to behave in character, the evidence is
inadmissible for that purpose, just as it is inadmissible with
respect to defendants charged with theft who have engaged in
thievery in the past.135
First, prior acts of sexual harassment by an individual
defendant can be offered under Rule 404(b) on the issue of
notice to the employer, in cases in which the plaintiff seeks to
hold the employer liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hos-
tile working environment. 36 The relevance of the evidence is
not solely dependent on a propensity inference; regardless of the
defendant's character, his commission of frequent acts of sexual
harassment in the workplace makes it more likely that the harass-
ment had come to the notice of the employer (or should
have). 3 V The second common avenue for admission follows sim-
ilar reasoning in that the other acts of harassment are themselves
relevant to establishing the claim, rather than relevant only for
their tendency to corroborate the plaintiffs allegations by show-
ing the nature of the defendant's character. Under this second
common use, the defendant's harassment of employees other
than the plaintiff is relevant to establish that the plaintiff was sub-
ject to a hostile working environment, provided the plaintiff
observed the incidents or was at least contemporaneously aware
135. See, e.g., McCue v. Kansas, Dep't of Human Resources, 165 F.3d 784,
790 (10th Cir. 1999) (excluding evidence of supervisor's acts of sex discrimina-
tion two years after plaintiffs termination; basis for relevance could only be
propensity).
136. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for
employers to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)
(1994). Prohibited sexual harassment can occur in two forms: 1) "quid pro
quo" sexual harassment, or "the conditioning of concrete employment benefits
on sexual favors"; and 2) "hostile working environment" sexual harassment, or
harassment that "creates a hostile or offensive working environment." Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986); see generally Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813 (1991) (distinguishing and critiquing quid pro quo
and hostile environment definitions of sexual harassment).
137. Compare Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 981 F. Supp. 1381,
1387 (D. Kan. 1997) (admitting surreptitious videotape, viewed by manage-
ment, of defendant describing incident of sexual harassment against plaintiffs
co-worker, on the issue of notice), with Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner &
Assocs., 866 F. Supp. 1086, 1092 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (excluding evidence of sexual
harassment against other employees; employer was the individual who sexually
harassed her, and therefore notice was not at issue).
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of them."3 8 Even if the harassment was directed at others, the
harassment still affected the conditions under which the plaintiff
worked.
The third common basis for admission of other instances of
sexual harassment by the defendant depends on a more subtle
understanding of Rule 404(b). Prior acts can be admitted in
order to prove "intent," but only if the underlying reasoning is
something better than "he's sexually harassed others before, so
he must have intended to do it again." Use of prior acts to prove
intent is likely the most misunderstood (and over-applied) aspect
of Rule 404(b).19 The defendant's intent should be at issue only
when the defendant concedes the commission of some relevant
act, and the only matter contested is the mental state with which
the act was committed. Because defendants are unlikely to argue
that undeniably crude behavior took place by accident, intent
will normally not be at issue with respect to whether sexually
harassing behavior actually took place.
Intent can be at issue, however, in quid pro quo claims of
sexual harassment140 with respect to the reason (a form of mental
state) some adverse personnel action was taken against an
employee. Using a standard example in sexual harassment cases,
a plaintiff alleges that she was fired on the basis of sex or, more
specifically, fired because of her unwillingness to tolerate sexual
harassment or accede to sexual demands. The employer, in
turn, alleges the plaintiff was fired for poor work performance.
At this point, the relevant act for purposes of recovery is the fir-
ing, not the sexually harassing act itself. As a result, the plaintiff
is usually permitted to introduce other acts of sexual harassment
committed by the defendant because they are probative of the
138. Compare Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777,
782 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that plaintiff may offer other instances of sexual
harassment in support of a hostile environment claim only if she was contempo-
raneously aware of the defendant's conduct and, as a result, that conduct con-
tributed to the hostile nature of her own work environment), with Tinsman v.
Hott, 424 S.E.2d 584, 587-88 (W. Va. 1992) (excluding evidence of other
instances of sexual harassment in support of a hostile environment claim when
the conduct took place four years prior to the plaintiff's employment, in a dif-
ferent workplace, and in a different state).
139. For an example of misapplication of the "intent" provision of Rule
404(b), see Russell v. Buchanan, 500 S.E.2d 728 (N.C. App. 1998) (applying the
analogous North Carolina version of Federal Rule of Evidence 404). In Russell
the court admitted evidence of a supervisor's adulterous, consensual affair with
another employee for the purpose of proving an "intent to sexually prey on
female subordinates." Id. at 730. Given that the supervisor denied any acts of
sexual harassment, this use of prior conduct is nothing more than propensity
dressed up as "intent."
140. See supra note 136.
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mind set with which he views employees. 141 Is that just a round-
about way of using propensity reasoning? Many have argued that
it may be.14 2 If it is, however, it is a limited form of propensity
reasoning that seems permissible under the rule. Provided the
prior acts are offered only to prove a mental state and not the
underlying act, the rule's prohibition of character proof to show
"action in conformity therewith" is not violated. In contrast, in
cases in which the plaintiffs remedy is tied to commission of the
sexually harassing act itself, prior acts of sexual harassment
should not be admissible.143 Their only possible relevance would
be to suggest the continuing nature of the defendant's propen-
sity to sexually harass.144
In the same manner that lawyers and judges have blithely,
and wrongly, contended that sexual harassment lawsuits always
permit proof of the "pattern and practice"145 of defendants' sex-
ual behavior with others-in complete disregard of the language
of Rule 404-lawyers and judges have characterized the addition
of Rule 415 as an invitation to characterize sexual harassment
141. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Ctr., 900 F.2d 153, 155-56
(8th Cir. 1990) (admitting other incidents of sexual harassment for the purpose
of proving a retaliatory termination).
142. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's
Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the
Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 578-84 (1990); Andrew J.
Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious Ban on Character Reasoning
from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REv. LITIG. 181, 190-96 (1998).
143. Neither should they be discoverable, because the inquiry cannot, as
a matter of law, be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). If the only possible relevance of other con-
duct is to demonstrate a pertinent propensity, all the discovery in the world
cannot make that propensity evidence admissible. For that reason, trial courts
should not grant requests for discovery of other sexual conduct until the propo-
nent has identified a potential non-propensity basis for admission.
144. One court has explained the difference with uncommon evidentiary
precision:
In light of these cases, we evaluate the propriety of introducing in evi-
dence the employer's alleged sexual harassment of employees other
than the plaintiff to prove the employer's motive behind firing the
plaintiff in a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim. At the outset, we
note that [defendant's] alleged harassment of other female employees
cannot be used to prove that [he] propositioned [plaintiff] on the
night before she was fired.... Evidence of [defendant's] sexual har-
assment of other female workers may be used, however, to prove his
motive or intent in discharging [plaintiff].
Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995).
145. SeeJones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (E.D. Ark. 1998), sum-
mary judgment granted, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Aiken, supra note 125,
at 1233 n.45.
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defendants as "sexual predators." '146 One teacher of evidence law
offered the following expert opinion: "Evidence professors know
that the amendment to Rule 415 caused President Clinton's
activities with Monica Lewinsky to be relevant at the Paula Jones
deposition."147 Evidence professors should, in fact, know better.
Rule 415 is a remarkable addition to the Federal Rules of
Evidence in that its intended effect diverges almost entirely from
its express language. Normally that degree of divergence would
be difficult to accomplish, because legislators are almost certainly
aware of the words before them. But in the case of Rule 415,
most of the relevant language is incorporated by reference from
elsewhere in the United States Code,148 and legislators were
almost certainly unaware of the full text. By permitting plaintiffs
in civil cases involving sexual assault to introduce the defendant's
other offenses of sexual assault for purposes of propensity rea-
soning, the new rule was universally intended to address a crisis
involving serious crimes 149-rape and child molestation-com-
mitted by "a small class of depraved criminals."15 By its terms,
146. SeeJoelle Anne Moreno, "Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to It That
in the Process She Does Not Become a Monster": Hunting the Sexual Predator with Silver
Bullets-Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415-And a Stake Through the Heart-Kansas
v. Hendricks, 49 FLA. L. REv. 505, 510 n.15 (1997); see also APPENDICES TO THE
STARR REPORT, supra note 125, at 67 (quoting the trial judge in Jones v. Clinton as
saying, "I'm also aware that in sexual assault cases, the Rules of Evidence
promulgated by the Violence Against Women Act has certainly opened it up.").
147. Margaret A. Berger, Does the Search for Truth in Our Scholarship Con-
tinue in Our Classrooms?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1179,1183 (1998). Rule 415 has never
been amended, but it does in effect "amend" Rule 404's character evidence bar
in cases involving sexual assault.
148. Rule 415 relies on the same definition of "offense of sexual assault"
found in Rules 413 and 414, which incorporates "any conduct proscribed by
chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code." FED. R. EVID. 413; FED. R. EVID.
414. Chapter 109A sets out the criminal offenses of aggravated sexual abuse,
sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a minor or ward, and abusive sexual contact. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2246 (1994).
149. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex
Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 567 (1994) ("[t]he uncharged misconduct
itself must be a serious offense"); Imwinkelried, supra note 132, at 298 ("grave
crimes"); Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence:
Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 277
(1995) ("serious sex offense").
150. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases
and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15, 24 (1994). Karp's address was incorpo-
rated as part of the Rule's legislative history by its Senate and House sponsors.
See Dale A. Nance, Foreward: Do We Really Want to Know the Defendant?, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. Rv. 3, 8 (1994).
In the context of so-called "acquaintance rape," two feminist evidence
scholars have argued that the propensity proof contemplated by Federal Rules
of Evidence 413 and 415 is not particularly relevant and, in addition, may
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however, buried by reference elsewhere, crimes of "sexual
assault" were defined as broadly as the indirect touching of
another's buttocks or breast from the outside of their clothing,
without consent."' Although it was never contemplated at its
enactment that Rule 415 would permit character proof in sexual
harassment cases, 152 sexual harassment plaintiffs eventually real-
ized that its expansive definition of "sexual assault" could encom-
pass the physical intrusions that sometimes accompany verbal
sexual harassment, whether in or out of the workplace. As with
Rule 404, however, the greater harm is not that Rule 415 will
expose other instances of sexual harassment; its principal danger
is in providing another platform for routine examination of con-
sensual sexual behavior under the justification that any relatively
minor unconsented touching could emerge."'
How did Rule 415 come to incorporate such a comprehen-
sive spectrum of greater and lesser forms of sexual misconduct?
The answer is difficult to discern, because none of the contempo-
raneous commentary noted the scope of conduct covered by the
Rule. Ironically, the adoption of Rule 415's definition of sexual
assault may be another illustration of how completely the initial
undermine feminist understanding of rape and rapists. Both would argue that
prior acts of rape have little probative value in identifying rapists because rape
is "culturally dictated, not culturally deviant." Baker, supra note 131, at 578; see
also Orenstein, supra note 86, at 692 ("As a logical matter, a feminist would
argue that given the tolerance for rape and its widespread perpetration
throughout society, evidence that the accused has raped someone before is not
necessarily probative in determining whether a rape occurred in the principal
case.").
151. "Whoever... knowingly engages in sexual contact with another per-
son without that other person's permission shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than six months, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1994)
(incorporated by reference in Rule 413 and 414, which are incorporated by
reference in Rule 415). Sexual contact is defined as "the intentional touching,
either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, har-
ass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2246(3) (1994). The legislative history of this provision, part of the Sexual
Abuse Act of 1986, does not reveal why Congress felt it was necessary to feder-
ally criminalize relatively minor instances of sexual misconduct, except to
explain that the drafters wished to establish a graded system of offenses "so that
the more serious the conduct, the more serious the punishment." 132 CONG.
REc. 2598 (1986).
152. See Aiken, supra note 125, at 1237.
153. Any concerns for the defendant's privacy interest in the disclosure of
sexual history were dismissed almost without discussion under the assumption
that the rule encompassed only serious sexual assaults; there could be no pri-
vacy interest in the commission of rape. "One who commits a crime is not enti-
tled to keep that fact secret." Bryden & Park, supra note 149, at 568; see also
Karp, supra note 150, at 24; Park, supra note 149, at 277.
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intention of the Federal Rules of Evidence to bar most forms of
sexual character proof has been turned on its head. The same
incorporated-by-reference definition of sexual assault has
appeared in the Rules before, as part of an earlier version of Rule
412's rape shield bar.154 It made sense in that context to adopt a
definition of sexual assault that would apply in the broadest pos-
sible range of sexual misconduct cases and therefore provide vic-
tims the broadest possible range of protection against sexual
character impeachment. Yet Congress adopted this same defini-
tion within Rule 415 in a context in which the focus was intended
to be specific and narrow: a legislative response to crimes of rape
and child molestation. Under the federal rules, avenues for sex-
ual character proof have always been narrowly crafted to meet a
specific point of probativeness. The unintended reach of Rule
415, furthermore, is only exacerbated by false, misleading, and
deceptive evidentiary arguments that presume a right to intrude
on private intimacy in the name of finding "truth."
CONCLUSION: LYING AS NULLIFICATION
How would Sissela Bok evaluate the significance of honesty
in response to governmental intrusions on private intimacy?
Should lying be significant if in response to questions that legal
or military institutions should have no power to ask? Should
some "sexual lies" be characterized as assertions of privacy rather
than as breaches of honesty? As discussed in Part I, Bok would
place a heavy burden of justification on the prospective liar
because of his or her inevitably biased evaluation of the risk
imposed. The proponent should first identify any truthful alter-
natives, weigh moral reasons for and against the lie in balancing
benefit and risk, and incorporate a perspective that reaches
beyond individual excuses. 155 It would be essential, in Bok's
view, to consider more than the immediate harms flowing from a
particular lie, including its effects on both the recipient and on
the liar; relevant harms should also include long-term losses to a
community's "general level of trust and social cooperation."
156
In Bok's view, and perhaps counterintuitively, the burden of
justifying lies by gay servicemembers under "Don't Ask, Don't
154. In an earlier form, Rule 412 was applicable to cases "in which a per-
son is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18, United States
Code." Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments, Act of 1988, § 7046,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4400-01. The current version of Rule 412 substi-
tutes the more expansive (and less cryptic) phrase "any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct." FED. R. EvD. 412.
155. See BOK, LYING, supra note 21, at 103-04.
156. Id. at 24.
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Tell" should be particularly heavy. She would identify the contin-
uing and deliberative nature of the lying necessary to serve under
the policy as a potentially greater danger than the infrequent or
spontaneous lie: "Lies which are planned are judged more
harshly than those told without forethought; single lies less
severely than repeated ones. Planned practices of deception are
",157therefore especially suspect ....
At the same time, however, Bok does recognize that intru-
sive inquiries regarding sexual practices and, in particular, insti-
tutional and societal pressures to "pass" as heterosexual, can
engender a persistent network of lying.158 She seems to agree,
despite her fundamental distrust of justifications for failures of
truthfulness, that lying can, under some circumstances, be an
appropriate response to inappropriate intrusions on sexual
privacy:
15 9
In this category fall also all the illegitimate inquiries
regarding political beliefs, sexual practices, or religious
faith. In times of persecution, honest answers to such
inquiries rob people of their freedom, their employment,
respect in their communities. Refusing to give information
that could blacklist a friend is then justified; and in cases
where refusal is difficult or dangerous, lying may fall into
the category of response to a crisis. One has a right to pro-
tect oneself and others from illegitimate inquiries, whether
they come from intruders, from an oppressive government,
or from an inquisitorial religious institution. A large area
of each person's life is clearly his to keep as secret as he
wishes. This is the region of privacy ... 160
Bok's reference to "illegitimate inquiries" would almost certainly
apply to the system of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"; it might also con-
157. Id. at 79; see also id. at 60 (noting that utilitarians "often fail to look at
practices of deception and the ways in which these multiply and reinforce one
another").
158. See id. at 79 ("Self-defensive lies can permeate all one does, so that
life turns into 'living a lie.' . . Political beliefs or sexual preferences unaccept-
able to a community compel many to a similar life-long duplicity . . ").
159. I use the term "privacy" with respect to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" with
some reservation because the policy requires so much more than maintenance
of privacy; it would be more accurate to say that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
imposes a requirement to maintain secrecy. The two concepts overlap but are
not the same. One can make a voluntary choice to keep certain aspects of life
private, but a much greater effort would be required to keep that information
secret. "But privacy need not hide; and secrecy hides far more than what is
private. A private garden need not be a secret garden; a private life is rarely a
secret life." BOK, SECRTS, supra note 21, at 11.
160. BOK, LYING, supra note 21, at 150.
SEX AND LIES
ceivably apply to misuse of the legal system as a forum for moral-
izing about sexuality. But this is precisely what Bok's analysis
lacks-any specific application of the latitude for lying she
grants. Under what circumstances can individuals justifiably lie
in response to inappropriate intrusions into private intimacy?
Does that mean that one may lie in response to government
inquiry under either military or civilian authority? It may be that
most people-not just most moral philosophers or most academ-
ics-would have trouble answering that question with any speci-
ficity because they cannot possibly fathom the factual
circumstances in which the resources of the government would
be deployed in an effort to compel them to discuss their sexual
lives."' For gay servicemembers, that circumstance is a realistic
possibility each day they serve, and the statements they make,
whether official or casual, false or carefully true, are often crafted
with that possibility in mind.
Bok's analysis of "lies in a crisis" incorporates an evaluation
of lies in response to a crisis that is chronic, rather than acute or
episodic, developing as a result of some ongoing institutional
coerciveness. The questions she raises concerning an ethic of
truthfulness in the context of chronic crisis could easily have
been asked by servicemembers seeking ethical guidance for their
service under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": "How do we respond to a
law, a procedure, a whole network of corruption, perhaps
oppression? .. . Should [we] adopt its standards merely to sub-
sist and get [the] job done? Or should [we] resist? Openly or
secretly? And at what risk?'ql 2 Interestingly, Bok illustrates these
questions with the now obsolete hypothetical concerning false
claims of physical or mental disqualification (including, I sup-
pose, homosexuality) for the purpose of avoiding military ser-
vice. Bok dismisses any justification for lying under these
circumstances, as "there are honest alternatives to going along
with the request they consider unjust: they can refuse to submit,
and accept the consequences." 6 ' In the case of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell," in contrast, there are no alternatives that combine
service to country and an ethic of truthfulness: lying is part and
parcel of service. Overt resistance is obviously not an option
161. But see Sissela Bok, Lies: They Come with Consequences, WASHINGTON
POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at C1 (finding no justification for President Clinton's sex-
ual lies, even though "[flew among us would want to live in an inquisitorial
society in which our most intimate concerns were subjected to relentless public
scrutiny," because lies by public officials undermine democracy).
162. BoK, LYING, supra note 21, at 114-15.
163. Id. at 117.
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when even unintended failure of secrecy constitutes a violation
under the policy.'64
When institutional practices all but encourage lying as a
solution to a coercive choice between dishonesty and compli-
ance, Bok may give the greatest potential latitude for dishonesty:
[I]t is the system which, in presenting the choice in the
first place, is degrading and in need of change .... And
the system obviously encourages the spread of dishonesty
in a way that the individual crisis response does not. The
system is, therefore, much less excusable than the individ-
ual deceit which forms a part of it.1
6 5
A rule of law can, in application, present such a coercive choice.
Bok crafts a hypothetical involving a law of divorce that permits
dissolution of marriage only upon the commission of adultery.166
Spouses who wish to divorce but have not committed adultery are
offered three coercive choices: to comply with the system's
expectation and falsely allege adultery, to actually commit adul-
tery against their inclination, or to forego divorce. It is probably
no accident that the hypothetical arises in the context of intimate
relations-the persistent link between sexual conduct and char-
acter for truthfulness will more often tend to create such coer-
cive choices.
16 7
How, then, does one judge the lying required by "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" or, more broadly, the lying that will inevitably be
prompted by the association between evidence of sexual charac-
ter and evidence of truthful character? How does risk balance
against benefit when risk and benefit are measured from not
only an individual but also a community perspective? The exer-
cise of contextual judgment will be a necessary ingredient-a dis-
tinctly non-Kantian approach and, in the context of the
institution of law and of the military, also a distinctly uncomforta-
164. See id. ("In evaluating such choices one has to take into account the
degree to which the request is indeed unjust, the available alternatives, the
severity of the consequences of overt resistance, and the effects of lying, not
least on the liars themselves.").
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. Bok notes that the Talmud permits untruthful answers in response
to inquiries about marital relations. See id. at 73. Similarly, Jesuit priests at
Georgetown University have argued, in the context of the Clinton impeach-
ment, that it can be honorable to lie in response to inquiries about private
sexual intimacy that the questioner has no right to ask. "It's something no one
has any right to know. If someone has no right to know something, you are
forbidden to disclose that kind of information about yourself or about
another." Aaron Davis, Alma Mater Hates Sin, Loves Sinner, USA TODAY, Oct. 5,
1998, at 4A.
SEX AND LIES
ble one. It is, of course, difficult to reach any legal consensus on
a contextual ethic of truthfulness when lawyers speak of "abstract
norms as subjective and of facts as indeterminate.... One per-
son's justice is another person's oppression.""16 It is also difficult
to discern any military consensus on a contextual ethic of truth-
fulness when the military is willing to accept a regulatory scheme
that demands lying within an environment that otherwise con-
demns it.
The advantage of categorical judgment with respect to an
ethic of truthfulness is that it is simple-at times also simplistic.
It is easy to conclude, for example, that civil defendants should
never be excused for lying, no matter what the nature of the
inquiry. It becomes especially easy if we assume the rule of law
provides litigants with the right to demand and to obtain truthful
answers, with the appropriateness of the demand taking a distant
second place to an insistence on the importance of truth. Dis-
honesty, in this view, directly denies what the questioner has the
right to obtain; dishonesty in and of itself denies justice:
And it is absurd, I believe, to argue that forcing the civil
defendant to choose between lying and revealing facts that
indicate that she indeed owes compensation affronts her
human dignity more than permitting her to preserve her
honor by eluding ajustjudgment affronts the human dig-
nity of her victim.. . . Here the victim's right, and her
dignity as a human, outweigh the right and dignity of the
victimizer.
1 69
With respect to sexual character evidence, the quoted author's
use of gender pronouns above is ironic. He never considers that
a civil litigant might be forced to reveal intimate information for
purposes unrelated to the merits, even though the paradigmatic
example of use of the legal system for moralizing about sexuality
would be the cross-examination of women who are victims of sex-
ual assault. A more interesting argument would have addressed
whether the same stringent expectation of truthfulness should be
imposed on women under those circumstances.
There has been far too little attention paid to the inappro-
priateness of the intrusions and far too much attention paid to
the truthfulness of the responses. The simplistic ethic of "the
right to remain silent is not a right to lie" 7 ' means little when
there is no practical option to remain silent and lying is the only
means available for preservation of privacy for oneself and others
168. SIMON, supra note 72, at 10.
169. LUBAN, supra note 66, at 203-04.
170. Id. at 200.
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and, in the case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the only means avail-
able for preservation of the opportunity for honorable military
service.' 71 Contrary to Bok's concern that the skewed perspec-
tive of the liar might be privileged at the expense of the
deceived, in the context of lies as assertions of sexual privacy,
only the perspective of the deceived seems to be heard. Whether
justified in terms of providing legal redress or in terms of ensur-
ing military readiness, the question is always privileged over the
answer, and the right to demand disclosure is always privileged
over the right to maintain privacy.
When moral reasons that support lying in a particular con-
text-the benefit as opposed to the risk-are given fair hearing,
the simple, reflexive assumption favoring truthfulness fails.
When expectations for disclosure are largely based on expecta-
tions for sexual morality, lies in response can discourage the use
of government authority for the purpose of moralizing about sex-
171. The doctrine of the "exculpatory no" provides an interesting com-
parison. In Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998), the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant's false denial of culpability in response to an
investigator's interrogation (the "exculpatory no") could be prosecuted as a
false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), contrary to the prevailing prac-
tice in a number of federal circuits. Justice Scalia dismissed the argument that
the "exculpatory no" exception was necessary under the Fifth Amendment
because otherwise suspects would face the coercive choice of "admitting guilt,
remaining silent, or falsely denying guilt." Id. at 810. In the Court's view, the
consequence, if any, of exercising the option to remain silent "does not exert a
form of pressure that exonerates an otherwise unlawful lie." Id. Justice Scalia
also rejected the more persuasive practical concern of prosecutorial abuse: that
investigators who are unable to prove a substantive violation of the law will
instead manufacture an offense by fishing for lies during the investigatory pro-
cess. See id. at 812-17 (Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., concurring). For general discus-
sion of the "excupatory no" doctrine," see United States v. Solis, 46 M.J. 31
(C.A.A.F. 1997) (rejecting the "exculpatory no' exception for military courts);
Stephen M. Everhart, Can You Lie to the Government and Get Away With It? The
Exculpatory-No Defense Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 99 W. VA. L. REv. 687 (1997); Lt.
Brent G. Filbert, Article 107, Uniform Code of Military Justice: Not a License to Lie,
ARMY LAw., Mar. 1994, at 3; Lt. Col. Bart Hillyer & Maj. Ann D. Shane, The
"Exculpatory No"-Where Did It Go?, 45 A.F. L. REv. 133 (1998); Richard H.
Underwood, Peijury! The Charges and the Defenses, 36 DuQ. L. REv. 715, 784-788
(1998); Scott D. Pomfret, Note, A Tempered "Yes"to the "Exculpatory No", 96 MICH.
L. REv. 754 (1997).
Defendants in civil cases, of course, do not have the right to remain silent
and may be compelled to respond to discovery and to testify at trial. As a practi-
cal matter, gay servicemembers cannot indefinitely decline to discuss the sort of
routine, everyday circumstances that could reveal credible information related
to violation of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell". Even if the "exculpatory no" exception
had been upheld, however, it generally applied only to brief, simple denials and
not to the more elaborate lying that is necessary under the policy. See Brogan,
118 S. Ct. at 808.
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uality and can facilitate appropriate assertions of privacy. In the
case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," requisite lies by gay ser-
vicemembers-lies which put them at risk of reprisal by their
own countrymen, even as they contribute in service to country-
can constitute one of the highest forms of patriotism. Judgments
on the appropriateness of intrusions are, of course, individual
and contextual judgments. One has to consider the intrusiveness
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" improper before one can justify lying
as a form of servicemember nullification 172 of the policy. One
has to believe in the fundamental importance of excluding sex-
ual character proof from the resolution of legal disputes-even if
it results in fewer verdicts for plaintiffs in sexual harassment
cases-before one can justify lying as a form of citizen nullifica-
tion in response to questions grounded in false and misleading
evidentiary argument.
The employment of contextual judgment would require that
the inquiry or intrusion be evaluated in the same manner as the
prospective lie given in response. Are there alternatives to the
demand for disclosure of private intimacies? How does benefit
compare to risk in weighing moral reasons for and against inquir-
ies or intrusions related to sexual morality? Consideration of
risk, moreover, should include a measure of the harm that results
to the community, not just to the individual, from the misuse of
military and legal institutions as forums for moral judgments
about sexuality. Under this reverse perspective, one that asks
that the intrusion be justified in the same manner that a lie in
response has always had to be justified, lies would no longer con-
sidered in isolation from the circumstances that produce them
172. Both Professor Simon and Professor Luban address the issue of
whether lawyers can ethically disobey the law for a greater cause, and their dis-
cussions are helpful in evaluating whether individuals can ethically disregard an
expectation of truthfulness. See LUBAN, supra note 66, at 31-49; SIMON, supra
note 72, at 77-108. Can lying in effect serve as a form of nullification of legal
duty in the same sense that jurors sometimes engage in nullification? In
Simon's view, "obligation to 'law' may require violation of some legal norms in
order to vindicate more basic ones." SIMON, supra note 72, at 106. Luban simi-
larly distinguishes between "conscientious disobedience to law" and "willful dis-
regard of the law with a view to obtaining advantages over one's fellow-citizens."
LUBAN, supra note 66, at 35. Conscientious disobedience does not mean an
individual considers herself "above the law" or feels no obligation to "play by
the rules," see id. at 34; President Clinton similarly believed that gay ser-
vicemembers could serve without secrecy and still "play by the rules." See Eric
Schmitt, The Transition: News Analysis-Challenging the Military; In Promising to
End Ban on Homosexuals, Clinton Is Confronting a Wall of Tradition, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1992, at Al.
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and no longer viewed as the inevitably greater harm. Under the
most dishonorable of circumstances, lies could constitute the
most honorable of responses.
